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A Political Economy Approach to
Reforming the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
By Matthew C. Turk*
Abstract: Prohibitions against transnational bribery suffer from a paradoxical
problem of simultaneous over- and under-enforcement. On the “supply-side,”
U.S. enforcement against bribery through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) is increasingly over-aggressive, while enforcement by other developed
economies is nearly non-existent. On the “demand-side,” governments of
developing economies where bribes take place often have neither an interest in
nor the capacity to rein in their corrupt officials. In light of these shortcomings,
this Article proposes reforming the FCPA as follows. First, the SEC should
cease paying profits disgorged by corporate defendants into the U.S. Treasury.
Second, disgorgements should instead be transferred to the Host country where
bribery took place, conditional on the Host government’s cooperation with the
FCPA investigation. And third, if cooperation is not forthcoming, disgorgement
proceeds should be transferred to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Working Group—an international organization
designed to facilitate the enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery. Reforming FCPA enforcement in this manner would re-allocate the
proceeds from anti-bribery regulation on a global scale so as to properly align
the incentives of the parties involved and provide greater access to the
information required for effective enforcement.
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Chicago-Kent College of Law; Vijay Padmanabhan, Vanderbilt University Law School; and
Matthew Rand, Clerk for the Honorable Harry Edwards, D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The
views expressed herein are those of the author, which should not be attributed to any other
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or
Act)1 has been one of the fastest changing areas of federal criminal and
business law. Passed in 1977, the Act lay in abeyance until undergoing an

1

The central feature of the FCPA is its prohibition on the payment of bribes to
foreign public officials in order to obtain business. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2011))..
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astounding enforcement boom in recent years. 2 The dollar values at stake
have become impressive: FCPA enforcement in 2010, for example, resulted
in approximately $1.4 billion in combined corporate fines and penalties. 3
During this same period, international concern with transnational bribery
has risen as well, situating the FCPA as the focal point and driving force of
an increasingly complex international anti-bribery regime. 4
The boom in FCPA enforcement has given rise to calls for reform in
Congress as well as in a growing body of scholarly literature. This
commentary is largely divided into opposing perspectives, focusing
primarily on either under- or over-enforcement. Research from an
internationalist, pro-regulatory perspective argues that aggressive antibribery enforcement is justified on moral5 or economic grounds, and that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice
(DOJ) (together, Enforcement Agencies) should sustain or even increase
their efforts.6 Scholarship of a more critical “pro-business” bent argues that

2

See generally Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 89 (2010) (providing an overview of the
emergence of more active FCPA enforcement); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489 (2011) (same).
3
Peter Millar, Proactive Fraud Detection: The Truth is in the Transactions, BUS. FIN.
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://businessfinancemag.com/article/proactive-fraud-detection-truthtransactions-0307.
4
See infra Part II.C.
5
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S141, S146, S160 (2002)
(“True value actors . . . treat bribery and corruption as moral wrongs, not as consequential
goals that can be traded off against other interests . . . . For [these] actors . . . [b]ribery and
corruption came to be viewed as wrong in and of themselves, as a matter of principle.”);
Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 583, 592–93 (2006) (“[M]orally based antibribery laws criminalize payments on the basis of their classification as bribes, regardless of
their economic impact or considerations of efficiency. Under the moral approach, such
payments are universally proscribed due to their inherent unethical nature.”); Bill Shaw, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
689 (2000).
6
See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 129 (2010) (advocating for more vigorous enforcement); Rebecca Koch, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance,
28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379 (2005) (advocating for a more restrictive and precise
definition of what constitutes an acceptable “grease payment” under the Act); Philip Segal,
Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 170 (2006) (“This Article contends that from the
standpoint of anyone who would wish to deter bribery abroad, the FCPA has been greatly
under-enforced since it was enacted.”); Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439
(2010) (defending the rise in FCPA enforcements); Sandy A. Azer, Strengthening the
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FCPA enforcement should be scaled back, because out-of-court settlements
with suspect legal bases and skyrocketing penalties offend traditional ruleof-law values and deter legitimate forms of corporate investment. 7
Rather than advocate for either side of the severely bifurcated literature
outlined above, this Article argues that the current model of enforcement
against transnational bribery takes the paradoxical form of simultaneous
under- and over-enforcement. On the “supply-side,”8 U.S. enforcement of
the FCPA is increasingly over-aggressive.9 At the same time, enforcement
by the United States’ co-parties to a major treaty serving a similar function,
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Convention on Combating Bribery (OECD Convention), 10 is nearly non-

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Through a Private Right of Action (Aug. 25, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664040 (advocating for an
additional private right of action for FCPA violations).
7
See Dalton, supra note 5 (advocating for a de minimis exception to FCPA violations);
Tara Elliott, Risky Business: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Expand the Reach of U.S. Courts in a Global Economy, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 211 (2010)
(arguing that the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA should be scaled back); Mike Koehler, The
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010); Andrew Brady Spalding,
Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions
Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 560–65
(arguing that uncertain enforcement “takes a toll” on businesses’ efforts to comply with the
statute); Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United
States: Recent Extra-Territorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2897 (2005); Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket: How the Crackdown on
Payoffs Hurts Business and Enriches Washington, D.C. Insiders, FORBES (May 28, 2010),
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortionmendelsohn-bribery-racket.html; Andrew Weissmann & Alexandra Smith, Restoring
Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. CHAMBER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM (2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/restoring-balanceproposed-amendments-to-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.html; see infra Part III.A.
8
Investing corporations provide a “supply” of illicit payments that public officials in
Host countries “demand” in return for illegal favors within the Host jurisdiction.
9
“A [recent] Dow Jones survey found that 51% of companies have delayed, and 14%
have cancelled, business ventures abroad due to uncertainty over FCPA enforcement.”
Joseph Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 824
(2011). In response to concerns over the unpredictability of FCPA enforcement, the
Enforcement Agencies recently issued a lengthy “guidance,” but this document has been met
with tepid reviews. See U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
ENFORCEMENT DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
(2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf; see also, e.g., Joe Palazzolo &
Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14,
2012,
6:59
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735104578118850181434228.html
(quoting Steven Tyrrell: “[The Guidance] does little to fill in the gray areas . . . [and is] more
of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for companies who care
about playing by the rules.”).
10
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
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existent. On the demand-side, “Host countries,” where bribery takes place,
often have neither an interest in nor the capacity to rein in their corrupt
officials, as is required by the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC).11
This Article applies a political economy framework to analyze
enforcement of the FCPA and the broader international anti-bribery regime
with which it is intertwined. The supply- and demand-side issues described
above are at root “political economy” problems, in the sense that they
follow from strategies that the relevant actors rationally pursue based on
their basic political-economic posture in relation to bribery enforcement,
rather than from defects in the legal instruments at issue. 12 As a result,
these problems cannot be effectively addressed by the more “legalistic”
solutions proposed, which commonly call for modifying statutory
definitions or signing new, bolder treaties. 13
Specifically, the underlying political economy problems that lead to
both under- and over-enforcement are threefold.
First, the U.S.
Enforcement Agencies use the FCPA as a vehicle for public and private

Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]. The OECD
Convention, commonly known as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, has been ratified by
forty countries: all thirty-four advanced economies that are members of the OECD and six
non-member countries. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONVENTION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 2012 (2012),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf .
11
The UNCAC covers most of the world’s population and has over 158 signatory states,
including the United States. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res.
58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Dec. 9, 2003), reprinted in 43
I.L.M. 37. In contrast to the OECD Convention, which includes a relatively small group of
capital exporting states, the UNCAC’s nearly universal membership covers developing
economies, which experience the most severe problems with public sector corruption.
12
See Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2011) (providing
a taxonomy of the various modes of “political economy” analysis of the law). There are a
few, early examples of political economy analyses of the FCPA, although these are from
largely before the recent enforcement boom. See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of
Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.
665, 679 (2004); Kevin E. Davis, Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of
Transnational Bribery (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Research Paper Series, Olin Working
Paper No. 99-22, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=209608.
13
On June 14, 2011, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security held a hearing on potential amendments to the FCPA. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 47 (2011). Testimony included proposals to rewrite sections defining “foreign official” and “willfulness.” See id. (statement of Michael B.
Mukasey, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform; statement of Shana-Tara Regon,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; statement of George J. Terwilliger III).
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rent-seeking. Second, compliance with the OECD Convention creates a
prisoner’s dilemma-type collective action problem for OECD member
states. And third, Host countries often face severe resource constraints in
domestic enforcement and have an incentive to free-ride off U.S.
enforcement efforts. This Article proposes a three-part reform that uses the
narrow mechanism of the SEC disgorgement remedy 14 to address a diverse
but interrelated set of incentive structures that drive the political economy
dynamics identified above. First, the SEC should cease providing the
proceeds from disgorgement to the U.S. Treasury. Second, disgorged
profits should be transferred to the Host country where the illicit payment
took place, conditional on the Host country’s cooperation with the
Enforcement Agencies’ investigation. Finally, if cooperation is not
forthcoming, disgorgement proceeds should be transferred to the OECD
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (OECD
Working Group or Working Group).15
In contrast to the legalistic proposals aired in the literature and at
recent congressional hearings, this Article suggests reforming disgorgement
practices in a manner that would not directly ratchet the total level of anticorruption enforcement in a particular direction. Instead, this Article’s
proposal would re-allocate the proceeds from FCPA enforcement on a
global scale to properly align the incentives of the parties involved and
provide greater access to the information required for effective
enforcement.
First, diverting disgorgement revenue from government coffers would
reduce the overly aggressive aspects of FCPA enforcement by mitigating
distortions that the so-called “FCPA racket”16 has on policy decisions. 17 At
the same time, transferring disgorgements to cooperative Host countries
14
First used in the FCPA context in 2004, disgorgement is an equitable remedy rather
than a punitive fine. Disgorgement requires a liable party to forfeit the amount of “ill-gotten
gain” acquired through its wrongful action. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc.,
574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Unlike damages, [disgorgement] is a method of forcing a
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.”); SEC v. ABB Ltd.,
No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. 2004). Despite its recent vintage and circuitous statutory basis,
corporate disgorgement vastly exceeded the amount of actual penal fines levied by the SEC
in 2008, 2009, and 2010, with 2010’s astounding $529 million in disgorgement constituting
ninety-six percent of the SEC’s FCPA “revenue” for the year. Mike Koehler, SEC
Enforcement of the FCPA—2010 Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/01/sec-enforcement-of-fcpa-2010-year-in.html.
15
See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
16
See Vardi, supra note 7; infra Part III.A (arguing that FCPA enforcement has, to an
extent, become a booming cottage industry within the Executive Branch that vests all parties
involved—government prosecutors, private law firms, and the Executive Branch generally—
with a self-interest in continuously expanding the enforcement regime).
17
See generally infra Part III (discussing the proposal to divert disgorgement revenue
from the U.S. government).
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would improve the efficiency of FCPA investigations by giving foreign
governments, with valuable access to information, a financial stake in
successfully resolving investigations. 18 Lastly, re-allocating disgorged
funds to the OECD Working Group in instances of Host country
intransigence would address supply-side under-enforcement by leveraging
the OECD Working Group’s information-gathering and monitoring
capabilities, thereby allowing capital-exporting countries to better selfpolice compliance with the OECD Convention.19
More broadly, this Article can be understood as an attempt to make
progress in an increasingly common genre of public policy dilemmas facing
the United States. In a fully integrated global economy, the United States
can no longer take a purely unilateral approach to the regulation of
business, trade, or the environment if it hopes to be effective. 20 Because
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage abound,21 a primary consideration in
addressing the cross-border regulatory problems of a globalized economy is
how to construct a policy that is more strategic in its orientation than
traditional domestic regulation. That is, analysis and reform of new
transnational regulation cannot be reduced to an unconditional question of
“more” or “less” enforcement; rather, it must take account of the interests
and capacities of the various public and private actors involved on an
international scale. This will require unorthodox ideas and solutions such
as the re-allocation of proceeds from the SEC’s disgorgement remedy
18
Transfers would also help spur more general efforts by Host countries to combat the
demand-side of corruption. See generally infra Part IV.A (discussing the proposal to
transfer funds to Host countries).
19
In addition, transfers to the OECD Working Group would provide a mechanism for
side-payments to OECD member states that would not otherwise be inclined to comply with
the OECD Convention. See infra notes 314–316 and accompanying paragraph (explaining
the role of side-payments in bargaining theory).
20
See, e.g., DANIEL K. T ARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008) (providing a critique of Basel II’s international coordination
of financial firms’ capital requirements); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903 (1998) (proposing a competition-based approach to international securities regulation);
Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1142 (2001) (suggesting a common antitrust regime consolidated through the World Trade
Organization); Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 354 (2011) (describing the interplay between strict U.S. regulations and lax Chinese
regulations); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate
Change, (Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements, Disc. Paper No. 2010-33, Jan. 2010)
(analyzing the costs and benefits of overlapping international carbon reduction policies).
21
“Regulatory Arbitrage” is defined as the process of designing transactions or business
practices “specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential
regulation or laws.” Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997); see generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
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recommended in this Article.22
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on the
FCPA, a critical overview of the legal basis for the SEC’s disgorgement
practices, and an analysis of the trend towards more active transnational
anti-bribery enforcement. Part III argues that diverting disgorgement
revenue from the U.S. government would reduce the incentive for overenforcement of the FCPA and mitigate concerns about the development of
an “FCPA racket.” Part IV explains the proposal to transfer disgorged
profits to Host countries and the OECD Working Group in order to reduce
the incentive that foreign jurisdictions have to under-invest in anti-bribery
enforcement. Part V provides brief concluding comments.
II.

STATUTORY STRUCTURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FCPA
This Part provides context for the arguments developed in Parts III and
IV of this Article. Subpart A reviews the FCPA’s statutory history and
substantive provisions. Subpart B describes the statutory basis and
underlying equitable principles of disgorgement and argues that they are
consistent with this Article’s proposal to transfer disgorgement proceeds
outside of the U.S. Treasury. Subpart C reviews the domestic and
international expansion of anti-bribery enforcement over the past two
decades and argues that the most plausible explanations for this trend reflect
the concerns with over- and under-enforcement that this Article’s proposal
seeks to address.
A. Statutory Background
The FCPA was passed in 1977, largely as a response to the uproar
generated by corporate bribery practices revealed during investigations into
the Watergate scandal. 23 The legislative history indicates that the purpose
of the statute was to discourage unethical conduct by U.S. businesses and
ensure the efficiency of international markets. 24 The DOJ provided a more
22

Shifting disgorgement proceeds to third parties is actually not as radical of a policy as
it may seem at first glance, as the SEC already has a statutory mechanism for establishing a
fund to transfer disgorged profits to third parties through the Sarbanes-Oxley “Fair Funds”
provisions. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011); see also infra Part
II.B (arguing that the equitable and legal principles underlying the disgorgement remedy cut
in favor of transferring forfeited profits to the non-U.S. third parties identified in this
proposal).
23
See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 1 (2005); Bixby, supra note 2, at 92.
24
See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (“[Bribery] rewards corruption instead of
efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards.”); Foreign and
Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs,
94th Cong. 76 (1976) (“Bribery corrodes the confidence that must exist between buyer and
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recent articulation of the Act’s purpose: “Congress enacted the FCPA to
bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public
confidence in the integrity of the American business system.” 25 The FCPA
is enforced by the SEC, which can only bring civil penalties, and the DOJ,
which is responsible for certain civil suits and all criminal prosecutions.26
However, the SEC and DOJ often enforce the Act through joint
investigations and settlement negotiations. 27
The substantive prohibitions of the Act come in two forms: antibribery provisions and books-and-records provisions. The anti-bribery
provisions define a prohibited act as comprising the following elements:
(1) a payment, offer, or promise of;
(2) anything of value;
(3) to any foreign official or any other person while knowing that all
or part of the payment will be passed along to a foreign official;
(4) with corrupt intent;
(5) for the purpose of influencing an official act or decision of the
person;
(6) to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with or directing
business to, any person.28

Books-and-records provisions concern the keeping of corporate
accounting records that conceal illicit payments. They require an issuer to
“make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transaction and dispositions of the assets of

seller if domestic and international commerce is to flourish.”). Amid domestic outcry, there
was also the foreign policy goal—as evidenced by the statements of lawmakers during
deliberations on the Act—to secure a positive reputation for U.S. corporations overseas in
order to maintain Cold War alliances. See Spalding, supra note 7, at 378–90 (arguing this
point through a detailed review of the legislative record).
25
The Lay Person’s Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions,,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-personsguide.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Lay Person’s Guide].
26
See U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
ENFORCEMENT DIV., supra note 9, at 4–5.
27
See David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality,
Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009) (“The agencies often work
together to bring parallel criminal and civil proceedings against the same party. In
investigations involving issuers over which both agencies have jurisdiction, informal
cooperation—rather than formal policy—determines the agency that will actually conduct
the investigation.”) (citing Paul V. Gerlach & George B. Parizek, The SEC’s Enforcement of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES REPORTER 14-1, 14-3
(West 2d ed. 2008)).
28
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2011).
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the issuer.”29
The FCPA has an extremely broad jurisdictional reach. The
jurisdictional hook of the Act covers three types of actors who make illicit
payments in foreign jurisdictions: (i) “issuers”; 30 (ii) “domestic concerns”;31
and (iii) “any person” that has contact with U.S. territory in furtherance of
the illegal bribe. 32 A sufficiently liberal interpretation of the “any person”
provision has allowed the Enforcement Agencies to reach “both foreign
business entities as well as foreign nationals, for the bribery of public
officials in their own country, as well as those of other foreign nations.” 33
Although the FCPA was not vigorously enforced during its first
decade, corporate lobbying pressure mounted against the perceived severity
of the Act and its detrimental effect on the international competitiveness of
U.S. corporations, and resulted in the FCPA being amended in 1988 (1988
Amendments).34 The 1988 Amendments, part of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988,35 altered the FCPA by tinkering with the

29

Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A). While the anti-bribery provisions require a specific intent to make
a corrupt payment, a books-and-records violation is subject to strict liability, with the
qualification that criminal liability can only attach to persons “knowingly” violating the
provision. Id. § 78m(b)(5) (“No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or
account described in paragraph (2).”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916, 919–21
(1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1952–54 (suggesting that a
“head in the sand” approach would violate the accounting provisions).
30
The term “issuers” includes companies that offer registered securities in the United
States or that are required to file periodic reports with the SEC, as well as their officers,
directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on their behalf. 15 U.S.C. §
78m(b)(2)(A).
31
See id. § 78dd-2.
32
See id. § 78dd-3. These jurisdictional provisions were added by the 1998
Amendments to the FCPA. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-366, sec. 2(c)(1), § 78dd-1(g), sec. 2(d), § 78dd-3, sec. 3(d)(1), § 78dd-2(i),
112 Stat. 3302, 3303–04, 3305 (amended 1998) (§§ 78dd-1(g) (for issuers), 78dd-2(i) (for
domestic concerns), 78dd-3 (for any persons)).
33
See Bixby, supra note 2, at 101 (summarizing the provision similarly by arguing that
“[t]his change suggests that the FCPA can reach foreign agents and employees of domestic
concerns, as well as U.S. nationals living anywhere in the world who have very little contact
with the United States”); Ashe, supra note 7, at 2898 (citing as an example: ABB Ltd.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 2049, 83 SEC Docket 849 (July 6,
2004)).
34
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 243 (1997) (“Critics contended that
U.S. businesses shunned legitimate transactions, the legality of which was difficult to assess
under the statute’s ambiguous language.”).
35
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, secs. 5001–
5003, §§ 103(a)–104, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415–25 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1,
78dd -2, 78ff (1988)).
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knowledge requirement, 36 creating two affirmative defenses, and adding an
express “facilitating payments” exception. 37
In addition, the 1988
Amendments exhorted the U.S. government to pursue an international antibribery treaty in order to “level the playing field” for U.S. corporations who
saw themselves as singled out for policing under the Act while foreign
corporations in other developed countries bribed with impunity. 38 The last
round of FCPA amendments was the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998 (1998 Amendments), which brought the Act into
greater conformity with the 1997 OECD Convention’s requirements. 39
Specifically, the 1998 Amendments expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction to
cover foreign corporations or natural persons by inserting the
aforementioned language that makes the anti-bribery provisions applicable
to “any person” that has territorial contact with the United States in
furtherance of a bribe, whether or not they are a U.S. issuer or domestic
concern.40 Incorporating a capacity to apply the FCPA’s prohibitions to
foreign corporations or natural persons was consistent with the United
States’ goal in pushing for the OECD Convention 41 to “even the playing
36

The knowledge requirement was (arguably) narrowed from a “reason to know” or
negligence standard to a requirement of actual knowledge that the payment was a bribe to a
foreign official or willful blindness as to that fact. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A). This
amendment was not much of a restriction in practice, because, as attorney Deming notes,
“the ‘reason to know’ standard was never applied by the Justice Department” and the actual
knowledge requirement as amended “continued to be expansive.” DEMING, supra note 23, at
31–32.
37
Congress created affirmative defenses for any payments that are prohibited but would
be legal under the “local laws” of the foreign jurisdiction and also for “reasonable and bona
fide” business expenditures “directly related to . . . the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of products or services. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1) to -3(c)(1) (the “local
law” defense); id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2)(A) to -2(c)(2)(A) (the “promotional expenses” defense).
Like the new knowledge standard, these new affirmative defenses have done little to relax
the FCPA’s bite in practice and have never been successfully invoked in court. See
generally Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464 (2010). “Facilitating
payments,” also known as “grease payments,” are made to “secure or accelerate performance
of a nondiscretionary act that an official is already obligated to perform.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd1(b); DEMING, supra note 23, at 15.
38
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 924 (1988) (Confr. Rep.), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1957; Tarullo, supra note 12, at 674–75 (citing the “level playing field”
concern as one of the legislative purposes behind the 1988 Amendments).
39
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2011)).
40
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(i) (for domestic concerns);
OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.1 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the
offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory.”); supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
41
John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J., Mar. 18, 2007, at 50–51 (“As the
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field” for U.S. businesses operating abroad.42
B. Legal Basis and Equitable Principles of Disgorgement Remedy
Disgorgement is a civil remedy with roots in the traditional equitable
remedies of restitution and recoupment. 43 Imposition of the disgorgement
remedy requires corporations subject to FCPA liability to forfeit the amount
of “ill-gotten gain” arising from the bribery at issue. Use of the
disgorgement remedy is a recent but growing practice on the part of the
SEC. In fact, the SEC never sought disgorgement in the FCPA’s first
twenty-seven years, until the ABB Ltd. settlement in 2004.44 Since 2004,
the SEC has sought disgorgement “in virtually every” case it has brought, 45
collecting over $1 billion in disgorgement and related prejudgment interest
in more than sixty FCPA proceedings.46 In 2010, ninety-six percent of the
proceeds from SEC FCPA settlements consisted of disgorgement and
prejudgment interest, a total amounting to approximately $500 million.47
The SEC’s legal basis for requiring disgorgement in connection with
FCPA violations is complicated and “achieved through interrelated statutes

United States ramped up the FCPA in 1998, it also persuaded the 30 industrialized nations
belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to sign a treaty
agreeing to adopt similar laws.”); Spalding, supra note 7, at 391–92 (discussing U.S.
interests in the OECD Convention).
42
Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2290, 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998) (“U.S. companies
have had to compete on an uneven playing field, resulting in losses of international contracts
estimated at $30 billion per year.”) [hereinafter Presidential Statement].
43
Disgorgement is therefore technically not a “penalty” and is not intended to punish the
defendant. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)
(“Unlike damages, [disgorgement] is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount
by which he was unjustly enriched.”); Elizabeth S. Stong, Basics of the SEC’s Disgorgement
Remedy, 43 PRAC. LAW. 67, 69 (1997).
44
See Consent of Defendant, SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. Nov. 30,
2004),
available
at
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/d80/d80f39308746a9feec133667a06bb452.pdf?i=9c0b79cfc7
dfb7164daa6be68ea8f5a6.
45
Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, FCPA DIGEST (Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, New York, N.Y.), Oct.
1, 2009, at x, http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-100209-FCPA-Digest-RecentTrends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf.
46
Paul R. Berger et al., Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs?, FCPA UPDATE
(Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2011, at 2,
http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/9d56da80-1da1-4e29-bc274288643df3cc/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ea922c2f-78d8-46ea-ad2d69638418a04e/FCPAUpdateAugust2011.pdf.
47
The breakdown is as follows: $529,967,294 in total settlements; $20,182,000 in civil
penalties; $509,785,294 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. See Koehler, supra note
14.
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showing no clear congressional intent that disgorgement apply to FCPA
prosecutions.”48 The SEC’s fining authority under the FCPA was added in
the 1988 Amendments and is provided in § 32(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),49 but this section only allows for fines
of up to $600,000 per violation by an issuer. Instead of relying on § 32(c),
the SEC resorts to its general civil fining authority under § 21(d)(3) of the
1934 Act50 in combination with the 1990 Penny Stock Reform Act, which
amended the 1934 Act to grant the SEC statutory authority to impose
disgorgement.51 While not explicitly disallowed by the FCPA, the “lack of
any statement that disgorgement should be part of the SEC’s enforcement
arsenal, and the rarity of the remedy at the time that Congress passed the
FCPA and its amendments”52 have led some to question the propriety of the
remedy.53 As with many aspects of the FCPA, the exact contours of the
SEC’s disgorgement authority have never been tested in court. 54
The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)55 in 2002 provided important
modifications to the SEC’s remedial authority, including a “Fair Funds for
Investors” provision that allows the agency to decide whether to contribute
proceeds from disgorgement to the U.S. Treasury or to a special fund for

48

Weiss, supra note 27, at 499.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2006)).
50
Weiss, supra note 27, at 497.
51
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429, secs. 202–203, §§ 21B–21C, 104 Stat. 931, 937, 939 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2011)); Weiss, supra note 26, at 485. Previously the SEC’s
ability to demand disgorgement rested entirely on caselaw. See SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).
52
Weiss, supra note 27, at 497 (“Neither the reports of the House or Senate floor
discussion of the FCPA or its subsequent amendments, nor the 1981 follow-up report from
the U.S. General Accounting Office on corporate bribery and the FCPA, mention
disgorgement as a remedy.”) (citing H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 36,303–08
(1977); S. 305, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 13,816–23 (1977); H.R. R EP. No. 95-831 (1977)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121; H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977); S. REP.
No. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098; ; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, AFMD-81-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS
(1981)).
53
See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1237 n.13 (2006)
(“The propriety and legality of [FCPA disgorgements] have not been tested in the courts.
Whether Congress intended the equitable disgorgement remedy to subsume the FCPA’s
express fining provisions is the issue.”).
54
Weiss, supra note 27, at 486.
55
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(i) (2011) (amended 2012)
(providing for civil or criminal forfeiture of property and transfer to eligible foreign
countries that participated in the seizure of that property).
49
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investors.56 In theory, the SEC has the legal authority to transfer
disgorgement proceeds into a fund for shareholders of the corporation
charged with violating the FCPA, but this has not happened in practice.
And rightly so: it is difficult to see how shareholders are “victimized” by
corporate bribes that procure business overseas and increase corporate
profits.57 Returning the profits from bribes to shareholders of bribing
companies merely reinstates the original “unjust enrichment.” 58 But the
policy option created by the Fair Funds provision does reflect an implicit
understanding that the disposition of disgorgement can serve a
compensatory function, with the “victim” as the appropriate recipient.
The equitable principles underlying disgorgement also cut in favor of
the compensatory policy animating the Fair Funds provision.
Disgorgement is a sub-class of restitutionary remedies in which the wrongdoer is “restored” to its original position before receiving the ill-gotten
benefit.59 Most narrowly understood, then, it does not matter who is the
recipient of disgorged funds. However, in cases where there is no other
compensatory mechanism available, it seems only natural that the party that
has suffered harm be the recipient. This policy is reflected in the original
Restatement of Restitution itself, which provides that “a person who has
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.”60
The most plausible party harmed by FCPA bribes is the Host country,
which has seen its legal system undermined and its public officials
corrupted through the illicit payments. 61 In fact, the U.K. has already begun

56

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308.
See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and The Compensation Conundrum, 60 FL. L. REV.
1103, 1123–37 (2008) (arguing that investor compensation through the Fair Funds
mechanism only makes sense under narrow circumstances inapplicable to the FCPA).
58
See id. at 1118 (“The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought a new twist,
changing the disposition of the money penalties so that the penalties began to serve the dual
purpose of deterring potential violators of the securities laws and compensating harmed
investors.”).
59
Another way to conceptualize disgorgement is as the mirror-image of expectation
damages in contract law: “[D]isgorgement places the promisor in the position that she would
have been in had the contract had been performed. Accordingly, perfect disgorgement
would make the promisor indifferent between performing, on the one hand, and paying
damages, on the other.” Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law,
105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 561 (2006).
60
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
61
This has been recognized by a recent U.N. report on transnational bribery. See U.N.
High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comprehensive Study on the Negative Impact of the Nonrepatriation of Funds of Illicit Origin to the Countries of Origin on the Enjoyment of Human
Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Ann. Rep. of the U.N. High
Comm’r for Human Rights, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/42 (Dec. 14, 2011) (“[D]isgorgement
of profits is a remedial measure that forces a defendant to ‘return’ the profits of crime to the
57
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to embrace this position under its recently-enacted Bribery Act by requiring
corporate defendant Mabey & Johnson Ltd. to disgorge £123,000 to the
jurisdiction where the underlying violations occurred in order to
“compensate [the] victims.”62 Another candidate for compensation is the
capital-exporting OECD countries whose companies are forced to compete
in an international marketplace distorted by corruption. FCPA expert Mike
Koehler makes the point in a straightforward fashion:
I do not know what the exact answer [concerning the recipient of
disgorgement] should be, but I am comfortable in my conclusion that
the best answer is not $703 million (USD) solely to the U.S.
Treasury because a French, Dutch, and Italian company allegedly
bribed Nigerian officials—something that actually happened over a
10-day period earlier this summer.63

Koehler’s common sense intuition is consistent with the equitable basis of
the SEC’s FCPA disgorgement authority, and informs this Article’s
proposal to transfer disgorgement to Host countries or the OECD Working
Group.
In summary, both the theory and practice surrounding the SEC’s use of
disgorgement reinforce this Article’s proposal for several reasons. First, the
SEC’s legal basis for requiring disgorgement, while likely sound on a
technical level, 64 is nonetheless convoluted and has no real historical
pedigree in the FCPA context. Calls for departure from the status quo,
therefore, would not upset any settled or long-standing legal practice. In
addition, neither the Fair Funds mechanism provided by SOX, nor the
equitable principles underlying the disgorgement remedy require the U.S.
State, an objective aligned with the purposes of returning assets at the country of origin.”).
62
See U.K. Bribery Act, c. 23, § 19 (2010); Mike Koehler, A Conversation with Richard
Alderman- Director of the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office, Oct. 4, 2010 (unpublished
responses
to
questions),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1687299 (noting Mr. Alderman remarks
on the Mabey & Johnson settlement: “The SFO [Serious Fraud Office, the U.K.’s Bribery
Act enforcement agency,] has been looking for ways in which to compensate victims in
countries in respect of which U.K. corporates have committed offences. This is a difficult
area because, while the victims will have suffered as a result of poor infrastructure etc., they
have no claim to compensation in a way that victims of fraud have.”); Richard L. Cassin,
Breakthrough in Britain,
FCPA BLOG
(Sept.
29, 2009, 8:02
PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/9/30/breakthrough-in-britain.html
(discussing
the
Mabey & Johnson settlement).
63
See Mike Koehler, Professor, Butler Univ., Opening Remarks at the World Bribery &
Corruption Compliance Forum 2010, at 4 (Sept. 14–15, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37367261/World-Bribery-and-Corruption-Compliance-ForumOpening-Remarks-of-Professor-Mike-Koehler).
64
See supra note 51 and accompanying text (citing powers granted to SEC by the Penny
Stock Reform Act amendment).
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Treasury to be the ultimate recipient of disgorgement revenue. Instead,
both the Fair Funds provisions and disgorgement’s equitable principles cut
in favor of transferring disgorged profits to harmed third parties, including
Host countries or OECD Convention members. A final point, discussed in
more detail below, is that disgorgements pursuant to FCPA settlements are
not only escalating in size, but are also often imposed in an arbitrary or
disproportionate manner. 65 These trends reflect certain conflicts of interest
at work in the enforcement process that could be mitigated by transferring
disgorgement from the SEC to third parties. 66
C. Increase in Anti-Bribery Efforts
The rise of FCPA enforcement over the past decade is the most
striking feature of the Act, which has undergone only modest textual
change since 1977, and no change at all since 1998. The increase in FCPA
enforcement has also paralleled the enactment of anti-bribery statutes and
treaties by other international actors. These trends present various puzzles
that require explanation to fully understand the contours of current
transnational anti-bribery efforts.
In addition to positive analysis, this subpart argues that the best
explanations for enforcement trends underline concerns that support this
Article’s main arguments. For one, the expansion of anti-bribery efforts at
the international level means U.S. policy on foreign bribery should be
strategic and international in scope, taking into account the interests and
capacities of other international parties FCPA enforcement will inevitably
become intertwined with. 67 The rapid expansion of FCPA enforcement
over a short timeframe also raises the concern that enforcement strategies
have been unbalanced and overly aggressive—the “over-enforcement”
problem Part III of this Article seeks to address. At the same time, the
proliferation of international agreements concerning corruption—and the
extent to which they have been embraced by both advanced and developing
economies—reflects a collective recognition that corruption is a serious
global problem, and animates the proposals for improving deterrence laid
out in Part IV.
1. The Trend Towards More Enforcement
FCPA enforcement in recent years has expanded across almost every
conceivable dimension, including: (a) the number of investigations initiated
and cases settled; (b) the size of penalties imposed; and (c) the scope of

65

See infra Part III.B for a critique of the SEC’s methods for calculating disgorgement.
See infra Part III.A (describing the rent-seeking dynamic within the Enforcement
Agencies).
67
See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
66
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jurisdictional and substantive legal theories put forward by the Enforcement
Agencies. These trends stand to continue or even accelerate, as both the
SEC and DOJ have announced new and ambitious plans for
institutionalizing a robust FCPA enforcement regime. 68 These plans have
been accompanied by similar efforts on an international scale.
From 1977 to 2003, the Enforcement Agencies pursued an estimated
total of sixty cases, or slightly more than two FCPA cases per year.69 After
2004, however, the number of both SEC and DOJ enforcement actions rose
for six consecutive years, culminating in 2010 when the SEC and DOJ
pursued twenty-six and forty-eight actions, respectively. 70 Table 1 below
illustrates the steadiness of this trend71:
Table 1: FCPA Enforcement Actions, 2004–2011
2004

2005

2006

2007

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

3

2

5

7

8

7

20

18

2008

2009

2010

2011

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

DOJ

SEC

13

20

14

26

48

26

25

23

The size of penalties per enforcement action has followed the same
rising trajectory as the number of actions. 72 The Enforcement Agencies set
records for the amount of total penalties levied each year from 2007 to
2010,73 with the ten largest dollar penalties from this period, 74 eight of
which resulted from settlements reached in 2010.75 Activity slowed down
68

See, e.g., infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
See Bixby, supra note 2, at 103 (noting that between the FCPA’s enactment in 1977
and amendment in 1998, the DOJ brought a total of twenty-five criminal prosecutions);
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 522, n. 171 (providing a similar estimate).
70
2011
Year-End
FCPA
Update,
GIBSON
DUNN
(Jan.
3,
2012),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.
71
Table 1 is adapted from Gibson Dunn’s 2011 Year-End FCPA Update. See id.
72
See Bixby, supra note 2, at 109 (“[N]ot only by the numbers of cases, but also by the
amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied against the defendants”).
73
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 555–56.
74
Weissman & Smith, supra note 7, at 2.
75
2010
Year-End
FCPA
Update,
GIBSON
DUNN
(Jan.
3,
2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. The
two largest payouts by 2010 were the settlements with Siemens in 2008 ($800 million) and
KBR/Halliburton in 2007 ($579 million), with several settlements of equally staggering
magnitude reached in 2010. Id. The largest 2010 settlements include: BAE Systems PLC
($400 million); Snamprogetti/ENI ($365 million); Technip ($338 million); Daimier AG
($185 million); and Alcatel-Lucent ($137.4 million). Id.
69

341

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:325 (2013)

only slightly during 2011, in which the Enforcement Agencies “collected
approximately $652 million.”76 This general upward trend applies with
equal strength to the disgorgement remedy, as detailed in the previous
subpart.77
The jurisdictional reach of the FCPA has also expanded over the past
dozen years to include parties, such as foreign entities and individuals, who
were not previously subjected to active enforcement under the statute.78
While enforcement actions against individuals were relatively unheard of
before 2006, the Enforcement Agencies pursued charges against ten
individual defendants in that year and against fifteen individuals in 2007.79
FCPA enforcement has also been increasingly directed at foreign
corporations. The first criminal action against a non-U.S. party was in 2006
against Statoil ASA for payments to Iranian officials. 80 But non-U.S.
defendants have become more common since then: nine of the ten largest
FCPA settlements ever were imposed on non-U.S. corporations over 2010
and 2011,81 and every enforcement action instituted in the first quarter of
2010 and every investigation initiated in 2011 was against a foreign
corporation.82
The reach of the FCPA during the recent enforcement boom has been
aided in large part by the aggressive legal theories of the Enforcement
Agencies concerning key statutory language. For example, the DOJ has
stated that—because foreign businesses that receive bribes are often stateowned enterprises—its interpretation of what constitutes a “foreign official”
is broad enough so that “nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture,
import, export, pricing, sale and marketing of a drug product in a foreign
76
Mike Koehler, 2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Year in Review, 7 WHITE COLLAR
CRIME
REP.,
Jan.
27,
2012,
at
80,
82,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992616.
77
See supra Part II.B.
78
See generally Ashe, supra note 7.
79
Bixby, supra note 2, at 111. This trend has not let up, with sixteen individual
defendants in 2008 and forty-two individuals defendants in 2009, a year one major law
firm’s FCPA publication referred to as “the year of the individual.” Cases and Review
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, FCPA DIGEST (Shearman & Sterling, LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2010, at ii,
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf [hereinafter Cases
and Review Releases].
80
See In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54599, 2006 WL 2933839 (Oct. 13,
2006).
81
Paul R. Berger et al., The FCPA in 2011: The Year of the Trial Shapes FCPA
Enforcement, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2012, at 8;
Richard L. Cassin, In New Top Ten, Eight Are Foreign, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010),
http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2010/11/5/in-new-top-ten-eight-are-foreign.html
(listing the top ten settlements reached in FCPA cases).
82
Berger et al., supra note 81; Cases and Review Releases, supra note 79, at v.
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country will involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”83
Other examples include a large but amorphous interpretation of what it
means to “obtain or retain business,” 84 as well a generous approach to the
condition that “anything of value” may constitute a bribe, which was
construed in one case to include campaign t-shirts.85 In practice, the antibribery provisions’ “actual knowledge” or “willful” blindness requirements
have been applied on a constructive knowledge or “has reason to know”
basis.86 And, recent cases under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act have used a
“control person” theory to create a strict liability standard for parent

83
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Keynote Address to
the 10th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices
Forum
(Nov.
12,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/breuer_2.pdf). The OECD Convention’s
definition pales in comparison. See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. I(4)(a)
(“‘[F]oreign public official’ is defined as ‘any person holding a legislative, administrative or
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and
any official or agent of a public international organisation.’”).
84
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 971–77 (detailing a long list of questionable applications
of this phrase and arguing that “[d]espite Kay’s [United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 740
(5th Cir. 2004)] equivocal holding, there has since been an explosion in FCPA enforcement
actions where the improper payments are alleged not to obtain or retain any particular
business, but rather, involve customs duties and tax payments, or payments alleged to have
assisted the payer in securing foreign government licenses, permits, and certifications.”);
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 540–41 (same). To take one example, the Dow Chemical
settlement alleged payments through a fifth tier subsidiary, to Indian government officials to
register several agro-chemical products slated for marketing in time for India’s growing
season. Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 07-CV-336 (D.D.C. 2007),
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=133.
85
See SEC Sues the Titan Corporation for Payments to Election Campaign of Benin
President, Litigation Release No. 19107, 2005 WL 474238 (Mar. 1, 2005). Other cases have
involved fairly underwhelming sums at issue. The Westinghouse settlement, for example,
included an allegation of twelve monthly payments of $31.50 to India’s Central Board of
Excise and Customs. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies
Corporation Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Violations in India
(Feb.
14,
2008),
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/540/5405cace013845d322fad7e7ff94c379.pdf?i=a0512bf121
5d0370409344896331a3e4; Shearman & Sterling LLP, U.S. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies
Corporation,
FCPA.SHEARMAN.COM,
http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=93 (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
86
See Kenneth Winer & Gregory Husisian, The ‘Knowledge’ Requirement of the FCPA
Anti-Bribery Provisions: Effectuating or Frustrating Congressional Intent?, WHITE- COLLAR
CRIME REP., Oct. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/a1d4aa391324-4018-bd8a-1cbddfc15e02/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7e8b814e-446b-411d8722-1e747b29b303/FCPAWinerHusisian2009.pdf (“The DOJ and SEC . . . now interpret
the knowledge requirement so broadly that they have effectively eviscerated the 1988
statutory changes.”).
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companies of subsidiaries that violate the books-and-records provisions.87
The Enforcement Agencies’ recent actions and public statements
indicate an intent to institutionalize FCPA enforcement on a permanent
basis at its current or even greater levels of activity. The new,
institutionalized phase of FCPA enforcement is epitomized by DOJ
Director Breuer’s statement that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s
ever been—and getting stronger . . . . We are in the new era of FCPA
enforcement; and we are here to stay.”88 Accordingly, the DOJ is
committing more resources to FCPA enforcement, including a new Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) unit consisting of eight full-time, dedicated
FBI investigators.89 The SEC has followed suit. In August 2009, an SEC
reorganization created a specialized unit tasked only with FCPA
prosecutions,90 which SEC Division of Enforcement Director Robert
Khuzami announced would “focus on new and proactive approaches to
identifying violations.”91
Finally, international attention on anti-bribery enforcement, while
initially non-existent, gained momentum in the mid-1990s. The surge in
international anti-bribery activity was principally manifested in the signing
of new multilateral agreements and the enactment of domestic legislation
prohibiting transnational bribery. In 1996, the Organization of American
States adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,92 with
the OECD Convention following in 1997. And in 2003, the flurry of
international anti-bribery agreements continued with the signing of the
UNCAC93 and the African Union’s Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption,94 both modeled around the FCPA and OECD
Convention.95 Important recent developments include the passage of the
87
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 977–81; Westbrook, supra note 2, at 548; Shearman &
Sterling LLP, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products Inc., Douglas Faggioloi, and Craig D.
Huff, FCPA.SHEARMAN.COM, http://fcpa.shearman.com/?mode=form&id=230 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2013).
88
See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 24th
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html).
89
See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 559.
90
See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks
Before the New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm).
91
Id.
92
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-39 (entered into force in the United States Oct. 29, 2000).
93
G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11.
94
African Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption art. 4, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5.
95
See DEMING, supra note 23, at 115–16 (“[M]any of the concepts and measures
reflected in the OECD Convention . . . have been incorporated into the U.N. Convention.”);
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2010 U.K. Bribery Act96 and amendments to China’s criminal code in 2011,
which added a provision prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.97
2. Explaining Recent Trends
What is the explanation for the tremendous surge in anti-bribery
enforcement in the United States and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
internationally? It is important to venture an explanation, because
understanding why enforcement has increased in recent years casts light on
the role disgorgement has played in the process and on how altering
disgorgement rules may affect the behavior of the parties involved. There
are a number of competing but in some ways complementary hypotheses,
none of which can conclusively be considered the one underlying cause. 98
The first narrative is that, beginning in the 1990s, various interested
parties gained a new appreciation for the harm caused by corporate
bribery.99 Developing countries with high levels of bribery, once thought to
simply have a different commercial culture, began to lobby on their own
behalf for stricter international anti-bribery enforcement, making claims
about the “cultural imperialism” of foreign anti-bribery efforts lose
credibility.100 “Values” groups committed to the idea that bribery is wrong
in and of itself—Transparency International (TI) being the most
prominent—organized and became effective lobbyists at the international
and domestic levels.101 Finally, a series of bribery scandals in Europe

Westbrook, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that the U.N. and African Union treaties contain
provisions similar to those of the FCPA).
96
See Bribery Act 2010—An Introduction, PWC, http://www.pwc.co.uk/forensicservices/issues/bribery-act-2010-an-introduction.jhtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
97
See Darryl S. Lew, China’s New Anti-Corruption Law Goes into Effect May 1, 2011,
CLIENT ALERT: GLOBAL WHITE COLLAR PRAC. (White & Case, D.C.), Apr. 19, 2011,
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/49f8553b-00b9-4573-bf24741b0614e08c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d0253a48-813b-42cd-81d57d9e241e2dd4/Alert_Chinas_New_AntiCorruption_Law_Goes_into_Effect_May_1_2011.pdf.
98
This Part discusses leading theories, but is not necessarily exhaustive. Perhaps the
most modest, default explanation is that the FCPA trend is simply a subset of the more
general increase in federal, white collar, and global criminal law enforcement. See Ellen S.
Podger, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 325 (1997).
99
See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5.
100
See id. at S159 (“Beginning in the 1980s, however, some development experts, as well
as officials and NGOs in developing countries, began to change their views . . . . A turning
point was the World Bank’s 1989 Africa Long Term Perspectives Study, in which
development experts called for a rethinking of policy. A few years later, Southern
development groups ‘hijacked’ an OECD conference, demanding action against corruption
at an event designed to divert calls for change.”); Tarullo, supra note 12.
101
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S165–66. The normative case for anti-bribery
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roused public sentiment and framed bribery as a problem afflicting the
developed world as well, making agreement to the 1997 OECD Convention
possible.102 In sum, enforcement has arguably increased because of the
increased awareness of bribery as a problem.
A second line of argument focuses on the rational self-interest of
individuals and organizations involved in anti-bribery enforcement, rather
than changes in preferences or values.
As previously noted, the
Enforcement Agencies have used inventive legal theories to stretch the
jurisdictional bounds of the FCPA to its limits to target foreign companies
instead of domestic ones. 103 This prosecutorial strategy flips the collective
action problem raised by the OECD Convention on its head.104 Not only
does enforcement generate positive revenue for the U.S. government, it also
advantages domestic U.S. corporations that are less heavily investigated or
punished relative to their foreign competitors. 105 A state-based explanation
is buttressed by a public choice analysis at the intra-state level, which
shows that public officials within the Executive Branch can use
“enthusiastic enforcement” as a means for agency aggrandizement and
lucrative exit opportunities in white collar practices of private firms. 106

enforcement was also bolstered by a shift in the economic literature, which began to coalesce
around the conclusion that bribery had economically and politically corrosive effects, rather
than representing a socially efficient method for circumventing dysfunctional legal systems.
See infra note 208–12 and accompanying paragraph.
102
See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-19, at 55 (1998) (noting the prominence of then-recent
European bribery scandals in building support for the treaty).
103
A recent statistical study finds that monetary penalties against foreign companies
exceed those levied on U.S. companies, even when controlling for other relevant factors such
as the size of the bribe. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 24–25 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Working
Paper
No.
12-15,
2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487. Nine of the ten largest FCPA
penalties have been imposed on non-U.S. corporations. Berger et al., supra note 81. Every
investigation initiated in 2010 was against a foreign corporation. See Cases and Review
Releases, supra note 79.
104
Commentators have noted that the OECD Convention threatens to create a collective
action problem for member states: reduced bribery in international markets is a nonexcludable global public good that makes foreign markets more profitable for any state
capable of competing in them, and therefore rational states should be expected to underinvest in its provision. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 681–83 (arguing
that the OECD Convention locks its members in a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma); See also
infra Part IV.B.i.
105
But see Davis, supra note 12, at 13–20 (suggesting that a rational state may in some
cases unilaterally prosecute foreign bribery of its own nationals by selectively targeting only
those forms of bribery—which he refers to as “superfluous bribes”—that waste corporate
resources and fail a cost-benefit analysis).
106
See infra Part III.
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A third explanation combines elements of the previous two and
focuses on the connection between the rise of FCPA enforcement and the
passage of SOX in 2002.107 SOX came in the wake of the Enron and
WorldCom accounting scandals, and like the FCPA, was itself a response to
increasing public concern over corporate malfeasance. 108
SOX’s
requirements for more transparent corporate accounting provide fertile
ground for uncovering books-and-records violations of the FCPA. 109 In
addition, the substantial increase in SEC funding and staffing that SOX
demanded has provided the SEC with the resources to more actively
enforce other statutes under its mandate. 110 The idea that SOX was a
tipping point for FCPA enforcement complements the theories mentioned
above: it represents both an increased awareness and concern over the issue
of white collar crime, as well as a means for agency aggrandizement and
rent-seeking by various private and public actors.111
The proposals concerning disgorgement practices presented in this
Article are closely related to the overlapping explanations of increasing
FCPA enforcement outlined above. If part of the rise in enforcement is a
result of rent-seekers using large FCPA penalties to construct a miniindustry within the Executive Branch, then reducing the “profitability” of
this industry by removing disgorgement revenue will reduce the
Enforcement Agencies’ incentive to resort to questionable prosecutorial
tactics and overzealous investigations that disregard rule-of-law values and
pose a threat of over-deterrence. If, at the same time, a factor behind the
upward trend in enforcement is an increased awareness of the problem of
foreign bribery, then it is important to develop an alternative policy that
allocates disgorgement funds in a way that makes anti-bribery efforts more
effective. This Article’s proposal seeks to address both these issues
simultaneously.
107

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011).
While only loosely related to accounting fraud or structural issues of corporate
governance, a renewed call for prosecution of U.S. companies engaging in bribery overseas
arguably taps into the same general mood animating the passage of SOX, as well as the
broader trend of federalization and expansion of the prosecution of white collar crime. See
generally Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-lawmaking Power Within the
Executive Branch, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998); Podger, supra note 98.
109
See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011) (providing SOX’s heightened reporting requirements);
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 515–16; Yockey, supra note 9, at 794 (“[SOX] prompted an
increasing number of firms to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations, which are
considered ‘material’ events under SOX.”); Laura E. Kress, Note, How the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Has Knocked the “SOX” Off the DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U.
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 3–5 (2009).
110
See Bixby, supra note 2, at 104.
111
See Frank Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?, 52 EMORY L.J.
1297, 1305 (2003) (suggesting that the passage of SOX itself was an exercise in rent-seeking
by the accounting industry).
108
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III. CORRECTING FOR OVER-ENFORCEMENT: DIVERTING
DISGORGEMENT REVENUE FROM THE SEC
A leading source of inefficiency in current efforts to address
transnational bribery is over-enforcement of the FCPA, or more precisely,
enforcement of the statute in an unbalanced manner that is deleterious to
rule-of-law values and economic growth. 112 Subpart A provides a public
choice analysis of FCPA enforcement and explains how rent-seeking
behavior by government officials and private lawyers contributes to overzealous enforcement. Subpart B identifies how the rent-seeking dynamic
and its attendant over-enforcement lead to bad outcomes, including
arbitrary and disproportionate penalties, prosecutorial tactics that are
inconsistent with rule-of-law values, and deterrence of otherwise desirable
foreign investment. Subpart C argues that this Article’s proposed policy of
transferring the SEC’s disgorgement revenue from the U.S. Treasury to
third parties would reduce the pathologies of the current enforcement
regime.
A. Agency Costs and Rent Seeking in FCPA Enforcement
“Rent-seeking” is an economic concept from the public choice
literature,113 most commonly referring to private efforts to produce public
interventions that allow for monopoly or non-competitive profits.114 But the
term has also been adapted to describe public officials’ use of the
government’s monopoly over law enforcement to appropriate private
gains.115 The FCPA enforcement regime in its present form creates
112

See supra note 7.
Public choice theory applies economic principles to the political process. That is to
say, a public choice analysis proceeds from the economic assumption that private actors
maximize self-interest, and applies this assumption to individuals working in the public
sector. See generally GORDON TULLOCK & J AMES BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Gary S. Becker, A Theory
of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983);
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1984) (“[Public choice] long ago put public interest theories of
politics to rest. These theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishing rather than
explanations of real-world phenomena. They have been replaced by models of political
behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics.”).
114
See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (providing the first use of the term “rent-seeking”); Gordon Tullock,
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (providing an
early seminal treatment of the dynamics that came to be known as rent-seeking).
115
See Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 117 (2002) (“We . . . analyz[e] a government
motivated partially or entirely by rent seeking. This view of the government is quite
common in public choice scholarship. A rent-seeking government designs enforcement and
punishment with the goal of appropriating the rents of the criminal market.”); see also Gary
113

348

A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
33:325 (2013)

incentives for public officials to opportunistically push for ever-greater
enforcement at several levels of the federal government hierarchy. As a
result, the enforcement policies currently pursued involve a substantial
amount of rent-seeking by public officials and private lawyers.
Recognizing that public officials are not purely motivated by public
interest116 means that “agency costs” exist when there is a conflict between
private interests of public officials and the public interest. 117 Econometric
studies, as well as legal scholarship relying on a more anecdotal approach,
both conclude that agency costs lead to rent-seeking in public law
enforcement and lead prosecutorial decision-making away from the social
optimum.118 Bureaucracies as a whole have also been modeled with selfinterested objective functions of budget maximization or personnel
maximization.119
In pursuing FCPA violations, the Enforcement Agencies are far from
S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All: The
Virtues of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. POL. ECON. S259 (1999); Keith N. Hylton &
Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUPREME CT.
ECON. REV. 61 (2007).
116
A public choice analysis remains relevant even when the preferences of public actors
are often public-regarding. See Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, The Normative
Purpose of Economic ‘Science’: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method, 1 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 155, 160 (1981) (“[T]he only assumption required . . . is the assumption that
some individuals behave in their narrowly defined private interest at least some of the
time.”).
117
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[I]t is
generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will
make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the
principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as
well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s
decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.”).
118
See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the
Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 379 (2005) (using an econometric model to
argue that career-motivated DOJ attorneys try to maximize the sentencing length in the cases
they bring); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1987 (1992) (providing a legalistic account: “The real parties in interest (the public and the
defendant) are represented by agents (the prosecutor and the defense attorney) whose goals
are far from congruent with those of their principals. There is, accordingly, a potential for
conflicts of interest or, in the language of economics, a problem of agency costs”); Edward
L. Glaeser, Daniel P. Kessler, & Anne Morrison Piehl, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An
Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6602, 1998) (providing an econometric analysis showing that federal
prosecutors’ private incentive to use cases as a vehicle for human capital development
causes a disproportionate number of dangerous criminals to be held in state prisons less
equipped to deal with them than federal prisons).
119
See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 362–68 (2002).

349

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:325 (2013)

immune to agency costs. Like all law enforcement officials, DOJ and SEC
attorneys gain a reputation for efficacy by bringing actions and obtaining
large corporate settlements.120 In addition, attorneys and accountants in the
Enforcement Agencies are in a position to create a demand for legal and
accounting services which they are uniquely positioned to supply upon
leaving the government and joining private firms, 121 contributing to what
has been called a “cottage industry” of FCPA experts. 122 Corporations
charged with white collar offenses now routinely engage outside counsel to
perform elaborate and costly internal investigations, 123 effectively using
these firms as “branch office[s] of the prosecutor.”124 The increasing
tendency to resort to settlements with non-prosecution agreements, the
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the installation of corporate monitors,
and the emphasis on corporate cooperation in investigations are all
characteristics of a process in which prosecutions have become a joint
public-private undertaking. 125
Enforcement Agency attorneys can and do take advantage of this
“revolving door” with private law firms. 126 Mark Mendelsohn, head of the
120

See id.
See Vardi, supra note 7 (quoting Joseph Covington, head of white collar defense at
Jenner & Block: “This is good business for law firms . . . and Justice Department lawyers
who create the marketplace and then get yourself a job.”).
122
Yockey, supra note 9, at 793 (“[T]he rise in FCPA enforcement has produced a
cottage industry of FCPA experts, including lawyers, accountants, and consultants at
prestigious firms, which DOJ and SEC personnel often join after leaving their federal jobs
for considerably higher compensation.”).
123
Debevoise and Deloitte’s internal investigation of Siemens reportedly generated fees
of $850 million, while Skadden Arps’ investigation of Daimler cost at least $500 million.
Vardi, supra note 7.
124
See generally Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the
Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C.L. REV. 23 (2011); David S.
Hilzenrath, Justice Department, SEC Investigations Often Rely on Companies’ Internal
Probes, WASH. POST., May 22, 2011. This is not to say that encouraging internal
investigations is unwise from a public policy perspective. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: an Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes,
72 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687 (1997) (discussing how incentivizing companies to monitor,
investigate, and report employee wrongdoing may be an efficient enforcement regime).
125
See First, supra note 124, at 46–48. The DOJ’s “Holder Memorandum” and
“Thompson Memorandum” also provide detailed guidance for the forms of cooperation the
agency expects and encourages from defendant corporations. Memorandum from Eric
Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Att’ys (June 16,
1999) (on file with Dep’t of Justice); Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y
Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with Dep’t
of Justice).
126
See generally Mike Koehler & Ethan S. Burger, Recent High-Level Department of
Justice Departure Raises Recurring Questions that Require Prompt Action, ACJS TODAY,
Dec. 2010, at 1 (discussing how more and more attorneys are leaving governmental positions
where they enforced the law for private sector jobs where they defend clients against those
121
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DOJ’s FCPA department during the rise in enforcement, left to join the law
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP for $2.5 million a year,
an amount that the Wall Street Journal described as a “significant sum,
particularly for a lawyer arriving at the firm without a ready list of
clients.”127 Perhaps the most eyebrow-raising example occurred when
William Jacobson, Assistant Chief at the DOJ in 2007 when oil company
Weatherford International disclosed a bribery problem, left to become
partner at Fulbright & Jaworski (the firm handling Weatherford’s internal
investigation), and eventually became Weatherford’s general counsel in
2008.128 Enforcement Agency officials also routinely leave government to
consult as compliance monitors, a service costing one FCPA defendant a
projected $52 million over four years. 129 To be sure, the Enforcement
Agencies have ethics rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest, such as
a one-year “cooling-off” period for DOJ attorneys before they may appear
before the DOJ representing defendants. 130 But these rules serve only to
prevent the most egregious conflict of interest scenarios, and do little to
alter the fact that, to the extent that Enforcement Agency officials can
maintain the FCPA’s trajectory as a “sizzling hot practice area,” their
services will be in high demand among private firms. 131
FCPA enforcement also provides opportunities for rent-seeking at the
bureaucracy and Executive Branch levels. Recent initiatives by the SEC
and DOJ to increase and entrench organizational resources dedicated to
FCPA enforcement are consistent with public choice models of a personnelmaximizing and/or budget-maximizing bureaucracy. 132 Leaders in the
Executive Branch also benefit by establishing popular “tough on corporate
crime” bona fides133 as well as by tapping FCPA disgorgements and
same laws). The SEC also regularly experiences high-level departures to law and accounting
firms, as reflected by the sixty-six former SEC employees who filed 168 letters in 2008–
2009 disclosing clients they planned to represent before the SEC. Tom McGinty, Staffer
One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at C1.
127
Nathan Koppel, Top U.S. Bribery Prosecutor to Join Paul Weiss, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
14,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702303695604575182174285804354.html.
128
Vardi, supra note 7, at 2.
129
Id. As of 2010, seven of the thirteen FCPA monitors were former DOJ employees.
Id.
130
See Koehler & Burger, supra note 126, at 4.
131
The DOJ stated that it had roughly 150 ongoing FCPA investigations at the end of
2010. Richard L. Cassin, The 2011 Watch List, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 29, 2010, 8:02 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/12/29/the-2011-watch-list.html.
132
See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 362–68; supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text
(citing remarks made by SEC officials about “institutionalizing” the SEC’s newly expanded
enforcement apparatus).
133
White collar crime is subject to the same one-way ratchet as other areas of criminal
law, in which it is popular with the electorate to continuously escalate penalties and to
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penalties as an important source of revenue.134
Perhaps most importantly, Enforcement Agencies and Executive
Branch leaders face an incentive to expand the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach
in order to prosecute and collect revenue from non-U.S. corporations while
leaving U.S. companies unscathed and at a competitive advantage. 135 In
fact, as discussed before, nine of the ten biggest FCPA settlements have
been with foreign corporations.136 In 2010, ninety percent of the dollar
value of FCPA fines and penalties were imposed on foreign corporations.137
A recent study of FCPA penalties finds a statistically significant difference
between monetary penalties imposed on foreign corporations compared to
U.S. companies, even when controlling for the magnitude of the bribe and
market capitalization of the defendant.138 These are confusing figures for a
statute that purports to ensure the integrity of U.S. businesses.139
To be clear, the Enforcement Agencies are not “self-funding” in the
sense that they channel FCPA penalties directly into their budgets; fines are
paid into the U.S. Treasury. But there is plenty of evidence that the
Enforcement Agencies use the magnitude of FCPA penalties to leverage
increases in funding in a manner that fits the model of a budget- or
personnel-maximizing bureaucracy. 140 As the DOJ’s former Assistant
Chief for FCPA enforcement recently admitted: “the government sees a
profitable program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it
anymore.”141 And in the DOJ Civil Division’s 2013 budget justification,
cultivate a reputation as being “tough” on corporate crime. See Kahan, supra note 108, at
50. This is especially true in a post-Enron and post-financial crisis era in which corporate
corruption is perceived to be closely linked to negative movements in the business cycle.
See, e.g., GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 26–41, 38 (2009)
(“[T]he business cycle is connected to fluctuations in personal commitment to principles of
good behavior and to fluctuations in predatory activity.”).
134
Cf. Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PUBLIC CHOICE 455, 477–78 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (highlighting the influence of
presidential preferences in bureaucratic decision making from a theoretical perspective).
135
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
136
Berger et al., supra note 81.
137
Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 105 (2011).
138
See Choi & Davis, supra note 103, at 24.
139
The DOJ has stated: “Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of
foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business
system.” Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 25.
140
See Moe, supra note 134 (providing an overview of rational choice models of
bureaucratic decision-making); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971).
141
See Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAW. (May 17, 2011),
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457704533&Here_Come_the_
Payoff_Police (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief at the DOJ).
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the Division unselfconsciously declared itself the “profit center of the U.S.
Treasury.”142 The SEC has also historically lobbied for and justified
funding demands by reference to the amount of revenue it brings in. 143 The
frankness with which the Enforcement Agencies refer to themselves as
“profit centers” mainly reflects the fact that use of the FCPA as a vehicle
for rent-seeking is an open secret. As Perlis and Chais pointed out: “While
[several] causes have increased investigations, governments will keep
pursuing corrupt business practices for one very simple reason—it’s
lucrative.”144
Lastly, and most simply, revenue collected through FCPA enforcement
in general, and the disgorgement remedy in particular, is substantial: in
2010, FCPA enforcement resulted in approximately $1.8 billion in
combined corporate fines and penalties. 145 In that same year, ninety-six
142

See CIVIL DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2013 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLANS 23
(2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-civjustification.pdf (“Few profit centers can boast of a [comparable] return on
investment . . . .”); CRIMINAL DIV., DEP’T OF J USTICE, FY 2011 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 20–22
(2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-crmjustification.pdf (requesting more FCPA staff while noting that “the [Criminal] Division’s
FCPA prosecutions have resulted in fines and penalties totaling more than $1 billion”).
143
See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Operations,
Activities, Challenges, and FY 2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
51 (2011) (“It is important to note that the SEC’s FY 2012 funding request will be fully
offset by matching collections of fees on securities transactions.”); , Hearing on the FY 2012
Funding for the CFTC and SEC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t
of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (noting that “multi-million dollar [FCPA]
settlements” were part of a FY 2010 in which “disgorgements are up 20 percent, while the
amount of monetary penalties has almost tripled”); see also Joel Seligman, Self-Funding For
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 233, 241 (2004) (describing the
SEC’s push during the 1990’s to align its budget more closely with its “revenue”); Cyrus
Sanati, For S.E.C., Self-Financing Remains but a Dream, DEALBOOK (June 25, 2010, 6:56
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/for-s-e-c-self-financing-remains-but-a-dream/
(explaining the SEC’s partial success in obtaining “match funding” which would link the
SEC budget to the amount of transaction fees the agency collects).
144
Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2009,
1:06
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-opinionscontributors-michael-perlis-wrenn-chais.html; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, WALL ST. J.
(Feb.
17,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203711104577199412696071528.html
(“Justice may not mind these embarrassing [litigation] failures, considering the cash its
prosecutions are bringing in. The government saw a $1.8 billion windfall in FCPA-related
fines and penalties from Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 and
another $508.6 million in 2011.”); Mike Koehler, Is the FCPA a Government Cash Cow?,
FCPA PROFESSOR (May 21, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/is-the-fcpa-a-governmentcash-cow (agreeing with the logic of the Perlis & Chais quote).
145
See Koehler, supra note 137, at 100.
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percent of the FCPA penalties levied by the SEC consisted of
disgorgement,146 with disgorgement revenue approaching fifty percent of
the entire operating budget of the SEC.147 These eyebrow raising figures,
reinforced by the revolving door dynamic, create the impression that the
FCPA enforcement regime is essentially functioning as a for-profit industry
within the Executive Branch.148
The FCPA is not an undesirable statute per se, and this Article will
argue that deterring foreign bribery is a worthy and important public
policy.149 However, it is a question of balance, and because agency costs
are endemic to the current FCPA regime, government actors responsible for
enforcing the FCPA face opportunities to realize private benefits from
increasing enforcement efforts above the socially optimal level. 150
B. Adverse Consequences of the Agency Cost Problem
The rent-seeking dynamic described above, in which every member of
the FCPA enforcement apparatus benefits from expanding FCPA
enforcement, has had several harmful consequences. The recent boom in
enforcement has been characterized by aggressive and often unjustifiable
statutory interpretations, lack of judicial review, and arbitrary and
disproportionate penalties. The SEC’s disgorgement policies are arguably
the most prominent illustration of this dysfunction. These haphazard and
opportunistic enforcement practices have not only threatened procedural
regularity and “rule of law” values, but have also resulted in overdeterrence. Corporations have pulled back on investments in areas where
there is uncertainty over the scope and magnitude of potential FCPA
penalties, thus foregoing otherwise legitimate and productive foreign
146

See Koehler, supra note 14.
The SEC’s enacted budget for 2010 was $1.114 billion, a year in which disgorgement
revenue was $509 million. See id.
148
The magnitude of penalties is even more striking when compared to levels from the
recent past. In 2000, there was one FCPA enforcement action (by the SEC) with a total fine
amount of $300,000. Koehler, supra note 137, at 104.
149
See infra Part IV.A.
150
See infra Part III.B. (providing economic and legal bases for the over-enforcement
premise). It is likely impossible to exactly specify the optimal level of FCPA enforcement
on a global scale—taking into account supply- and demand-side enforcement by the United
States, other OECD states, and Host countries—in any meaningful or rigorous way. On the
other hand, it is widely acknowledged in literature that the socially optimal level of
corruption is above zero, and that therefore resources expended on completely eliminating
bribery—foreign or domestic—may be wasteful from a social welfare perspective. See
Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 33 (Kimberly Anne-Elliot ed., 1997) (“In seeking realistic reform it is
important to realize that, like all illegal activity, the efficient level of bribery is not zero.
Bribery is costly to control. Reforms must consider the marginal costs as well as the
marginal benefits of anticorruption strategies.”).
147
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investments. In addition to harming investing corporations, over-deterrence
can also function as a form of de facto “sanctions” that cut off developing
economies’ access to foreign capital.
1. Rule of Law
The Enforcement Agencies’ aggressive approach in recent years has
been largely inconsistent with traditional “rule of law” values that
emphasize the need to clearly define prohibited behavior, treat similar cases
similarly, and apply a separation of powers structure in which different
bodies define, administer, and review the law.151 A major source of this
problem is the Enforcement Agencies’ interpretations of the FCPA, as
investigations have pursued legal theories that push ambiguous portions of
the statutory language to their breaking point. 152 Enforcement Agency
positions as to what the relevant jurisdictional and knowledge requirements
are,153 who is considered a “foreign official” or “control person,” 154 what
constitutes a satisfactory compliance program, 155 and which payments are
considered a “bribe”156 are highly questionable or unclear at best. The
penalties assessed under these theories also appear arbitrary, as similar
cases have produced substantially different results. 157
The SEC’s disgorgement practices provide a prominent example of the
Enforcement Agencies’ weak statutory interpretations. In particular, there
is widespread criticism of the SEC requiring disgorgement in cases
involving books-and-records violations158 where no underlying act of
151
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) (providing a similar, five-element definition
that reflects the principles that “Rule of Law should allow people to plan their affairs with
reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal consequences of various
actions,” and “should guarantee against at least some types of official arbitrariness”).
152
See generally Koehler, supra note 7.
153
See Paul R. Berger, Erin W. Sheehy & Kenya K. Davis, Is That a Bribe?, 26 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 76 (2006); Ashe, supra note 7, at 2927–30.
154
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 977.
155
See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 489–99, 560–61; see generally Bruce Hinchey,
Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and
Suggested Improvements, 40 PUBL. CONT. L. J. 393 (2011).
156
See Berger, Sheehy & Davis, supra note 153. The FCPA’s definition of a bribe as
“anything of value” to “obtain or retain business” has not been conservatively applied. See
supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
157
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 984.
158
As of August 2011, there had been seventeen such cases since 2007, in which the SEC
has collected over $123 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. Berger et al.,
supra note 46, at 2. See, for example, the ITT case, where no anti-bribery violations were
charged, but final judgment was entered ordering ITT to pay “disgorgement of $1,041,112
together with prejudgment interest thereon of $387,538.11” and a $250,000 civil penalty.
SEC v. ITT Corp., No. 1:09-CV-00272, 2009 WL 330269, ¶ 1 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2009),
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bribery is charged.159 It is difficult to see a justification for this practice that
is consistent with legal principles underlying disgorgement. 160 Recall that
disgorgement is an equitable remedy requiring a liable party to forfeit any
ill-gotten gains from the actions giving rise to liability. 161 But if no bribe
has been charged, it is senseless—and more importantly, legally incorrect—
to claw-back profits from hypothetical transactions that have not been
subject to any legal challenge. Indeed, cases dealing with disgorgement
under the securities laws reject the SEC’s approach in the FCPA context.162
The case law also specifically disapproves of the use of disgorgement
remedies as a punitive measure, which is its only conceivable function
where no liability for illegal payments is asserted.163
When disgorgement is imposed in cases in which anti-bribery charges
are present, the practice still remains problematic—particularly considering
the escalating size of disgorgement settlements—in part because of the
inherent difficulty in calculating the amount of illicit profits. The SEC’s
transparency has been unimpressive on this point, as one commentator
explains: “the SEC settlement announcements often describe the size of the
bribe and the disgorgement from the violating company without mentioning
the benefit that the company actually received from the bribe-perhaps
because accurate calculation of such a benefit would be impossible.” 164 The
opacity of SEC disclosures does little to mask the inconsistency of
disgorgements required across seemingly similar cases, which has been
widely noted.165
Furthermore, regardless of the unique factual difficulties raised in the

available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp20896.pdf.
159
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 983–85; Weiss, supra note 27, at 479; Recent Trends
and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, supra note 45, at 4.
160
See Weiss, supra note 27, at 492; Berger et al., supra note 46, at 3 (“In the context of
a violation of the FCPA’s books and records or internal controls provisions, however, the
required causal connection between the wrong and any alleged ill-gotten gain is inherently
much more tenuous, if it can be said to exist at all.”); Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, supra note 45, at 5.
161
See supra Part II.B.
162
See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp. Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230–31 (D.D.C. 1989)
(applying the 1934 Act).
163
See id.; Koehler, supra note 7, at 983.
164
Weiss, supra note 27, at 507 (citing SEC v. Titan Corp., No. 05-0411, 2005 WL
474238, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2005)); SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04CV1141(RBW), 2004 WL
1514888, at *3 (D.D.C. July 6, 2004).
165
See Sasha Kalb & Marc Alain Bohn, Disgorgement: The Devil You Don’t Know,
CORPORATECOMPLIANCEINSIGHTS.COM
(Apr.
12,
2010)
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated/
(“Establishing any reasonable measure of predictability when it comes to disgorgement,
however, has proven challenging.”); see also Koehler, supra note 7, at 984–86 (comparing
the Lucent and UTStarcom cases and concluding “same facts, different results”).
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FCPA context, the SEC is currently applying an overly simplistic analytical
framework that tends to produce incorrect and overestimated disgorgement
amounts. The SEC typically calibrates FCPA disgorgements by making a
rough estimate of the “paper profits” from a particular project subject to
bribery.166 A more rigorous methodology—and one typically used in
analogous areas such as stock-drops related to securities fraud167—would be
to estimate the difference between the defendant corporation’s actual profit
and the likely profit in a “but-for” world where no bribe was offered.168
Such an analysis requires considering the “incremental probability of
winning generated by the bribe and the opportunity cost of the project
won,” both of which tend to produce a lower disgorgement number. 169
Thus, contrary to SEC practice, if a bribe generates less than 100% of the
profit from a particular project, the entirety of the profit should not be
considered an “ill-gotten gain.”
Judicial review of the various enforcement strategies detailed above is
rare. Accordingly, there is a lack of relevant “FCPA case law” because
cases are almost uniformly settled through out-of-court resolution vehicles
such as non-prosecution agreements. 170 The result is that disgorgement
impositions that courts routinely reject in other contexts—as well as
theories of jurisdiction and liability that stretch the FCPA to its limits—are
allowed to stand.171
In addition to a limited body of judicial opinions interpreting the
FCPA, administrative guidance has been minimal, further contributing to

166

See Kalb & Bohn, supra note 165.
Elaine Buckberg & Frederich C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and
Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 352 (2008) (“[A]lthough few courts have discussed the
concept of netting [finding the net but-for benefit] in the disgorgement context, the principle
is routinely invoked to calculate damages for securities fraud and, logically, the same
principle should apply to disgorgement.”).
168
Dr. Patrick Conroy & Dr. Graeme Hunter, Economic Analysis of Damages Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, May 5, 2011, at 5,
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_0511.pdf.
169
Id. at 1–2; see also Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for Corruption in Government
Contracting: Zero Tolerance Versus Proportional Liability 36–42 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law
Inst. Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2009/4, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=nyu_lewp (providing an
argument for further reducing penalties for bribery in proportion to the defendant
corporation’s monitoring efforts and value added from follow-on investment in the
underlying bribe-related project).
170
See Koehler, supra note 7, at 929–46 (describing the prevalence of non-prosecution
agreements and deferred-prosecution agreements in FCPA settlements). There is one
exception to the pattern of FCPA cases decided outside of court: cases against individuals
tend to end up in court much more often. See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 740
(5th Cir. 2004).
171
See Yockey, supra note 9, at 836.
167

357

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:325 (2013)

the uncertainty over how the Act will be interpreted and enforced. 172 The
recently issued “FCPA Guidance” sought to fill this interpretive gap and
had the potential to be a positive step towards clarifying the law. 173
However, the Guidance is primarily a catalogue of previous enforcement
decisions that gave rise to the current confusion, rather than a clear
articulation of how the Enforcement Agencies intend to approach
interpretative grey areas going forward.174
One clear constant, congruent with the rent-seeking model discussed
above, arises out of all this procedural inconsistency and legal chaos: FCPA
penalties, in the form of disgorgement and otherwise, are high and continue
to rise.175
2. Economic Harm
The current state of FCPA enforcement does not simply offend wellregarded procedural principles. 176 It also results in a practical harm: overdeterrence of foreign investment. To be sure, the premise of the Act is to
deter foreign investments facilitated by bribery, and such deterrence should
not be regarded as dysfunctional. However, overzealous application of the

172

Until November 2012, Enforcement Agency guidance was limited to the marginallyhelpful Opinion Procedure Release process. See Doty, supra note 53, at 1233–42 (arguing
that agency guidance was limited, especially compared to other statutory regimes);
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497, 566–74 (same).
173
See U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
ENFORCEMENT DIV., supra note 9.
174
See Matt Kelly, FCPA Guidance Released, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.complianceweek.com/fcpa-guidance-released/article/268299/ (quoting attorney
Erich Schwartz: “This voluminous Resource Guide is clearly a substantial effort to organize
the government’s thinking on a variety of issues that are important in understanding how to
comply with the FCPA. It is not, however, a clear roadmap for compliance . . . . The guide
largely avoids announcing new policy.”); Mike Koehler, Guidance Roundup, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Nov. 16, 2012, 12:08 AM), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/guidance-roundup
(reviewing reactions to the guidance and concluding that “the consensus . . . appears to be
that the guidance offers little in terms of actual new substance and that FCPA reform issues
remain. It appears that the only contrary publicly stated position is a press release from a
variety of civil society organizations”).
175
See Koehler, supra note 137, at 99 (“[M]uch of the largeness of FCPA enforcement in
2010 was the result of bold enforcement theories that seemingly conflict with congressional
intent in enacting the FCPA . . . . [E]nforcement in 2010 was more than just big and bold: it
was also bizarre. Among other things, FCPA enforcement suffers from several inherent
contradictions.”).
176
The negative practical consequences of procedural irregularities in applying the FCPA
are important, as rule-of-law based critiques can often descend to aestheticism or nostalgia
for the pre-administrative state. See Fallon, supra note 151, at 2–3 (“[M]any invocations of
the Rule of Law are smug or hortatory. . . . [T]he modern American legal system departs
significantly from the provisional account of the Rule of Law . . . and it is strongly arguable
that no plausible legal system could avoid departing from it in some respects.”).
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Act comes at a unjustifiable cost to U.S. corporations and the domestic
economy, as well as foreign jurisdictions where bribery takes place, which
are often developing countries. 177
Aggressive and haphazard enforcement of the FCPA has led to overdeterrence of foreign investment, because corporations facing substantial
uncertainty over when and how the statute applies will forego otherwise
legitimate investments to avoid the risk of prosecution. 178 A recent Dow
Jones survey found that fifty-one percent of companies delayed, and
fourteen percent cancelled, business ventures abroad due to uncertainty over
FCPA enforcement. 179 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also called for
reform, arguing that the main problem for businesses is lack of clarity and
certainty: “the solution to this problem is not to do away with the FCPA and
permit American companies to engage in bribery alongside their foreign
competitors. Rather, the FCPA should be modified to make clear what is
and what is not a violation.”180
Added to the cost of foregoing international business opportunities are
monitoring and internal compliance costs, which may tip the balance of
profitable investment projects from positive to negative, 181 and may also
create an environment where “agents and employees will become overly
risk-averse and thus deterred from taking actions that would otherwise
benefit their firms.”182 Finally, empirical studies generally show that the
177
See Dalton, supra note 5, at 615–16 (“Between 2003 and 2004 alone, the United
States exported $392.6 billion in foreign direct investment worldwide . . . . Even if efficient
conduct proscribed under the Act is only a small percentage of foreign investment, given the
considerable degree of investment being outwardly exported to foreign countries, the price
imposed by the over-inclusive Act may be significant.”).
178
Weiss, supra note 27, at 505 (citing George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty
and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295, 320–22 (2001))
(“Regulatory uncertainty has been quantitatively shown to be particularly harmful to
investment in other contexts—for example, antitrust—and, while no quantitative study is
available for foreign bribery, the likely result is similarly undesirable.”); Yockey, supra note
9, at 824–25; see also John Bray, International Business Attitudes Toward Corruption, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 316, 316 (2004).
179
See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 498; Yockey, supra note 9, at 824.
180
Weissmann & Smith, supra note 7, at 6.
181
See Miriam Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008)
(“Because the current corporate criminal liability standard is so broad and the collateral
consequences of a criminal indictment are so devastating, entities will attempt to avoid
formal charges ex ante by investing in ‘compliance’ products intended to impress
prosecutors in the future, even if these programs are more costly than effective. Risk averse
corporate managers may further attempt to avoid entity-based criminal liability by declining
beneficial investments simply because they seem too risky.”); Koehler, supra note 7, at 1001
(“The facade of FCPA enforcement also contributes to overcompliance by prompting riskaverse companies to reflexively launch expensive and time-consuming internal
investigations when the alleged conduct at issue may not even violate the FCPA.”).
182
Baer, supra note 181, at 1036; Yockey, supra note 9, at 824.
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FCPA diverts investment from countries with endemic corruption, 183 but
endemic corruption is present in a large swath of the global economy.184
Clearer guidance along with more consistent and proportionate penalties
could facilitate some degree of legitimate investment in these countries. 185
The over-deterrence of foreign investment that follows from
aggressive enforcement of the FCPA also deprives foreign jurisdictions—
often low income or developing countries—of valuable foreign capital.
FCPA scholar Andrew Spalding has argued that overly broad enforcement
of the FCPA functions a form of de facto “sanctions” against emerging
economies.186 The sanctions argument follows from the above-mentioned
empirical research showing that FCPA enforcement results in the
withdrawal of foreign direct investment (FDI) from high-corruption
developing economies. 187 The harm caused by the withdrawal of foreign
capital is compounded by the fact that it also changes the composition of
FDI in emerging economies, with “corrupt countries receiv[ing] less of their
FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt
countries.”188
The perverse incentives that encourage government officials to

183

See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J.
INT’L BUS. STUD. 634 (2008); Spalding, supra note 7, at 372–73; Anna D’Souza, The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade 3 (Cal. Ctr. for Population
Research,
Working
Paper
Series
No.
2009-06,
2009),
available
at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1m87n6hm.
184
Weissman & Smith, supra note 7, at 6 (“The statute should take into account the
realities that confront businesses that operate in countries with endemic corruption (e.g.,
Russia, which is consistently ranked by Transparency International as among the most
corrupt in the world) or in countries where many companies are state-owned (e.g., China).”).
185
See Spalding, supra note 7, at 401–03 (“There are numerous reforms to the text and
enforcement of antibribery legislation that would advance the policy of reducing bribery
without scaring companies away from emerging markets. . . . Mo[st] fundamentally, we
should reevaluate the underlying theories of liability by which the government holds
corporations accountable for FCPA violations.”).
186
See generally id.; cf. Tyler Cowen, One of the Best Ways to Help Haiti: Modify FCPA,
MARGINAL
REVOLUTION
(Mar.
15,
2010,
9:24
AM),
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/03/one-of-the-best-ways-to-helphaiti.html (“As it stands right now, U.S. businesses are unwilling to take on this legal risk
and the result is similar to an embargo. You can’t do business in Haiti without paying
bribes.”).
187
Spalding, supra note 7, at 373–74.
188
See id. at 373 (citing Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 183, at 635); Alvaro CuervoCazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 807 (2006). The
substitution of high-corruption foreign capital for low-corruption capital is significant
because FDI-exporting firms with a culture and history of unethical business practices can
have the effect of locking in and normalizing corrupt business practices among firms and
government officials in the Host country receiving the FDI. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra
note 104, at 99–102.
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constantly ratchet-up FCPA enforcement are probably not the sole cause of
the procedural problems and harmful consequences described in this
subpart. But it is difficult to see how they are not a significant contributing
factor. Executive Branch officials who benefit from more enforcement are
expected to pursue investigations pursuant to both strong and weak legal
theories, to invite ambiguity into the statute rather than remove it, to target
foreign corporations that are at best tangentially subject to the statute’s
jurisdiction, to pursue the largest penalties possible, and to over-estimate
corporate profits for purposes of disgorgement. 189 Such practices will lead
to an over-deterrence of otherwise legitimate foreign investment and
impose an unjustifiable cost upon businesses investing in developing
countries.
C. Transferring Disgorgement Would Reduce Rent Seeking
Diverting disgorgement revenue currently flowing into U.S. Treasury
coffers via the SEC would alter the dysfunctional incentives embedded in
the current enforcement regime and encourage more proportionate and
consistent outcomes. To the extent that FCPA enforcement abuses are a
product of a public-private cottage industry springing up around the FCPA,
making that industry less “profitable” will reduce the return on
prosecutorial and bureaucratic overreach, therefore reducing “investment”
in over-enforcement.
The benefits of transferring disgorgement sums follow from a basic
insight of microeconomics, as applied by the public choice literature. All
else equal, as available rents increase, investment in capturing those rents
by rent-seekers increase as well.190 In other words, “as rents become a more
important governmental objective, more resources are invested in detection
and punishment [of crimes that produce rents].”191
This Article’s proposal strikes at the converse of the relationship
described above: when the supply of available rents is reduced, a reduction
of investment in wasteful rent-seeking activities will follow. This same
connection has been identified by economic analyses of criminal procedure
189
Nothing less follows from a public choice analysis relying on the minimalist
assumption that at least some individuals in the public sector place some weight on their
private self-interest some of the time. See Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 116, at 160.
190
In the related context of competition among private actors for a monopoly rent,
investment in rent-seeking can be modeled mathematically as follows: I = [(n-1)/n2] * r(R),
where I represents the investment of a risk-neutral rent-seeker; n, the number of rent-seekers;
and R, available rents; the magnitude of r determines whether returns on rent-seeking
investment are diminishing or increasing. See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 336, 335–47
(deriving this equation and providing extensions). Note that the basic relationship between I
and R remains unchanged over varying values of r: what is important is that I as a function
of R is increasing. See id. at 336.
191
See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 115, at 128.
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in the context of rent-seeking law enforcement. Following an earlier
analysis by David Friedman,192 Hylton and Khanna argue:
[One] way to constrain the costs associated with abuses of
prosecutorial or punishment authority is to put restrictions on the size
of penalties or the process by which they are levied . . . . [O]ur
analysis suggests that penalty restrictions increase the cost of
punishment to the state, dampening incentives for wealth
extraction.193

When dealing with the fining authority of government agencies
investigating corporations, this analysis can be applied equally across
penalties whether they are nominally labeled “civil” or “criminal.” 194
The framework outlined above may be somewhat abstract, but the
analysis it represents is easily illustrated by reference to the literature
concerning private expenditures on political influence, or campaign finance.
When the wealth transferred from one group to another through legislation
or other government action represents the pool of available rents, campaign
contributions—whether legal or otherwise—can be understood as rentseeking investments by interest groups. 195 Perhaps unsurprisingly then,
empirical work in this area finds the same positive correlation between the
investment in rent-seeking (amount of campaign contributions and
lobbying) and available rents (roughly approximated as the size of
government budgets). 196 This relationship is robust across government
entities, whether at the state or federal level. 197
The same basic dynamic applies to the FCPA. Recall the discussion in
Part III.A supra, including the Enforcement Agency official’s statement
that when “the government sees a profitable program[,] . . . it’s going to
192

Friedman, supra note 115.
Hylton & Khanna, supra note 115, at 24–25.
194
See Friedman, supra note 115, at S263 (defending the choice to not distinguish
between civil and criminal penalties when the two are functionally equivalent); Hylton &
Khanna, supra note 115, at 116 (“The analysis here could be applied to other current topics,
including the extension of criminal procedural protections to civil suits brought by
government agencies.”).
195
See Fred S. McChesney, “Pay to Play” Politics Examined, with Lessons for
Campaign-Finance Reform, 6 INDEP. REV. 345, 349 (2002) (describing “[t]he orthodox story
[of] rent creation” as “referring to private-donor money as buying ‘access and influence for
their interests,’ . . . where rent refers to returns obtained through the political process rather
than through private-market exchanges”).
196
See Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & James B. Wilkinson, Maintaining the Status Quo:
Federal Government Budget Deficits and Defensive Rent-Seeking, 26 J. ECON. STUD. 5, 5
(1999) (“Evidence from a Parks regression technique suggests that total rent-seeking is
positively related to the amount of federal spending, as others have shown.”).
197
See John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are
Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger, 43 J.L. & ECON. 359 (2000).
193
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ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”198 A straightforward
implication of basic microeconomic principles predicts that reducing the
profitability of the “FCPA horse” should result in the government riding it
less often. In other words, a reduction in the private return to government
actors by withdrawing disgorgement revenue should deflate the so-called
“FCPA racket” and have a natural tendency to rein in some of the more
aggressive and unjustified enforcement practices described in Part III.B
above.
A reduction in available rents would tip the Executive Branch’s costbenefit analysis into net negative territory for legally “adventurous” cases
because they are more costly to pursue.199 For example, the logic of two
and a half-year sting operations in Africa—in which U.S. government
operatives offer fictitious “bribes” to Host country officials—may be
dimmed when the potential revenue at stake is drastically reduced.200
Pursuing cases via expansive statutory interpretations and creative legal
theories is also more costly than the pursuit of straightforward cases,
because the former have a greater chance of being challenged with
resource-intensive litigation in court and carry a lower probability of victory
at trial, which in turn lowers settlement value. 201 The Enforcement
Agencies’ mixed litigation outcomes in 2011, where negative judicial
scrutiny was previously unheard of, underline the increasing costliness to
prosecutors of over-extending the Act. 202 Removing disgorgement would
also mean fewer SEC staff devoted to the FCPA in the long run, 203 putting
pressure on the agency to pursue the “lower-hanging fruit” of FCPA
investigations that have clearer factual and legal bases.
Withdrawal of disgorgement revenue from the SEC would of course
198
See Rosenbloom, supra note 141 (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief
at the DOJ).
199
Of course, the standard caveat of economic analysis applies to this claim as well: an
economic model will provide a prediction about a behavioral tendency and not a narrative,
psychological claim about how enforcement officials literally calculate their self-interest.
200
See Berger et al., supra note 81, at 6–7 (describing the “SHOT Show” cases, in which
FBI agents posed as representatives of Gabon’s Ministry of Defense).
201
Indeed, economic models of criminal enforcement predict that “mixed” governments
that at least partially pursue self-interest along with the public interest are more likely to
expand the set of acts defined as illegal. See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 115, at 118
(“[I]f offenders have sufficient wealth, a rent-seeking government will define more acts as
illegal.”).
202
See Koehler, supra note 76 (detailing the Enforcement Agencies’ setbacks in a variety
of litigations as a result of increased judicial scrutiny in 2011).
203
The SEC has historically lobbied for and justified funding demands by referencing the
amount of revenue it produces. See Seligman, supra note 143 (describing the SEC’s push
during the 1990’s to align its budget more closely with its “revenue”); Sanati, supra note 143
(explaining the SEC’s partial success in obtaining “match funding,” which would link the
SEC budget to the amount of transaction fees the agency collects).
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have a significant, direct impact on the agency’s disgorgement practices. If
any disgorgement remedy imposed would thereafter be transferred to third
parties outside of the U.S. government, most of the SEC’s abuses in
imposing the remedy would cease to have any justification. For one, it is
difficult to imagine that the controversial and legally untenable practice of
requiring disgorgement in cases with only books-and-records charges and
no finding of underlying bribery would be in the agency’s interest once the
government is no longer in a position to receive the proceeds from such
settlements.204 Also, the incentive to inflate disgorgement amounts would
be greatly reduced if any money collected would be transferred to third
parties. As a result, the SEC would be less likely to put forward
unrealistically high disgorgement calculations based on faulty theories of
causation.205
This Part’s proposal and accompanying analysis works indirectly and
on the margin, and does not purport to be a cure-all. However, the
disgorgement proposal is superior to other top-down reform measures
considered at recent congressional hearings regarding the FCPA that seek to
directly modify or constrain prosecutorial behavior. 206 These alternative
measures in no way reduce the benefits the U.S. government and its
officials realize from over-enforcement, and would only channel
investigative zeal down new and creative paths that are equally undesirable.
Attempting to close particular legal “doors” available to prosecutors ignores
the FCPA’s multi-faceted expansion over the past decade, which shows that
the Act can be over-extended along any number of dimensions.207
IV. CORRECTING FOR UNDER-ENFORCEMENT: ENCOURAGING
ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS BY FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
Transnational commercial bribery is a serious problem that imposes
real costs on U.S. corporations and the Host countries in which they

204

See supra note 160 and accompanying text; supra Part II.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text. A reduction of total penalties imposed
under the FCPA through reduced disgorgements would also have mitigated the “revolving
door” issue discussed in Part III.A: as the costs of FCPA compliance for U.S. companies is
reduced, the demand for lawyers and accountants in currently thriving FCPA compliance
groups should be reduced in turn.
206
See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing to hearing testimony from June,
2011 recommending rephrasing statutory provisions concerning “foreign official” and
“willfulness”); Weissmann & Smith, supra note 7, at 7 (suggesting various statutory
modifications, including: “[1] adding a compliance defense; [2] limiting a company’s
liability for the prior actions of a company it has acquired; [3] adding a ‘willfulness’
requirement for corporate criminal liability; [4] limiting a company’s liability for acts of a
subsidiary; and [5] defining a ‘foreign official’ under the statute”).
207
See supra Part II.C.i.
205
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invest.208 This was not always recognized. Initially, the social science
literature contained mixed views on whether bribery was efficient, or
instead a detriment to political and economic development. 209 The current
consensus, however, is that competition for the favors of bribe-takers
dissipates social wealth more often than not, in a dynamic that applies to
bribing entities just as much as the countries where bribes take place. A
micro-level analysis reveals that resources are wasted in markets where
bribery takes place because of the transaction costs associated with secrecy
and the distortions created by government officials who actively seek to
broaden the market for bribes. 210 Cross-country studies that take a macrolevel approach also indicate that endemic corruption impedes foreign
investment, economic growth, and political development. 211 The latter

208
See The Costs of Corruption, WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004),
http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 (estimating that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes
each year, calculated using 2001–02 economic data, which “compares with an estimated size
of the world economy at that time of just over US$30 trillion . . . and does not include
embezzlement of public funds or theft of public assets”). In 2002 the African Union
estimated the direct and indirect costs of corruption at $148 billion, which at that time
amounted to twenty-five percent of the continent’s GDP. African Development Bank
Group, Proceedings of the Regional Learning Workshop on Combating Corruption in Africa
(Jan. 27–30, 2003) (on file with author). There is, of course, considerable room to question
how these numbers can be accurately measured and how to interpret their relationship to the
actual economic cost imposed.
209
See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968)
(“In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest
bureaucracy.”); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S158 (“Until recently, the dominant view
was that some forms of corruption are necessary, even beneficial, aspects of
development . . . . Corruption occurs because traditional norms are ineffective in dealing
with the rise of new groups and behaviors, while more appropriate norms have yet to
emerge.”); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 1320, 1322–24 (1997) (“Economists have shown that, in the second-best world when
there are pre-existing policy induced distortions, additional distortions in the form of blackmarketeering, smuggling, etc., may actually improve welfare even when some resources
have to be spent in such activities.”).
210
See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 334 (treating rent-seeking expenditures as a form of
bribery and identifying three forms of wasteful expenditures the bribe entails: (1)
expenditures of bribe-givers competing for government favors; (2) efforts of officials to
obtain bribes; and (3) third party distortions induced by actions of bribe givers and takers);
ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 12, 25; M.S. Alam, Some Economic Costs of
Corruption in LDCs, 27 J. DEV. STUD. 89 (1990); Bardhan, supra note 209, at 1322–24
(“One does not have to take a moralistic position on corruption to see that some of these
arguments above in favor of the efficiency effects of corruption are fraught with general
problems, even though in individual instances some redeeming features of corruption may be
present.”); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611–15
(1993) (“[T]he illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more
distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation.”).
211
JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND
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research finds some confirmation in the fact that developing countries
themselves have been among groups most vocally clamoring for efforts to
combat corruption.212 Thus, despite the critique of FCPA enforcement
practices outlined in Part III, there remains a need to build robust and
effective anti-corruption enforcement, rather than simply trying to curtail it.
Slow progress in the international enforcement of transnational bribery
is not due to legalistic shortcomings in the quality or number of legal
instruments addressing the issue. As discussed in Part II.B, anti-bribery
treaties have proliferated over the past fifteen years, and the OECD
Convention contains similar substantive provisions to those of the FCPA.213
Nevertheless, the three “major conclusions” of Transparency International’s
Progress Report 2011 on the enforcement of the OECD Convention were:
(1) “there has been no progress since TI’s 2010 progress report in the
number of countries with active enforcement”; (2) “the Convention has not
yet reached the point at which the prohibition of foreign bribery is
consistently enforced”; and (3) “reviews conducted by TI experts indicate
that the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political
commitment by government leaders.”214
As the TI report suggests in its allusion to political commitment, the
problem of under-enforcement stems from two underlying political
economy dynamics that affect the cost-benefit calculations of the actors
involved: (1) Host countries have an incentive to free-ride off of U.S.
investments in corruption control, and otherwise face high capacity
constraints when dealing with the local, demand-side of corruption; and (2)
compliance with the OECD Convention has not occurred because of the
prisoner’s dilemma that makes collective enforcement by member states
difficult to implement.
This Part discusses the Article’s proposal to remedy these structural
barriers to more robust enforcement of transnational anti-bribery measures.
Subpart A describes the proposal to transfer disgorged profits to the Host

REFORM 71–79, 100–07 (2007); NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, CORRUPTION AND
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia
Goldin eds., 2008); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995);
Mitchell Seligson, The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey
Evidence from Latin America, 34 WORLD DEV. 381 (2006); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is
Corruption on International Investors? 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000).
212
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S159–S160; Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, supra note 92.
213
See supra notes 92 and accompanying paragraph (identifying anti-bribery treaties
agreed to by the OECD, United Nations, Organization of American States, and African
Union).
214
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY
CONVENTION
5
(2011),
available
at
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/102/411/file/2011_OECDreport_EN.pdf.
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country where the bribe has taken place, conditional on the Host country’s
assistance in the FCPA investigation.
Subpart B explains the
recommendation to direct disgorged profits to the OECD Working Group
when cooperation on the part of the Host country is not forthcoming. While
withholding disgorgement from the SEC should be expected to reduce the
level of resources dedicated to enforcement by U.S. Enforcement
Agencies,215 transferring the proceeds to these third parties can nonetheless
make international anti-bribery efforts more effective overall and address
the problem of under-enforcement.
A. Disgorgement to Host Countries
Host countries play a critical role in transnational anti-bribery
enforcement.
Obtaining their cooperation would therefore make
enforcement considerably more effective. While the vast majority of these
states are parties to multiple and overlapping international conventions that
require affirmative efforts to combat corruption, 216 active enforcement
assistance on the part of Host countries is not always forthcoming. 217 The
jurisdictions where bribery takes place often have developing economies
and resource-constrained governments with a low capacity for policing
corruption.218 Host countries may also rationally under-invest in bribery

215

See supra Part III.C.
The UNCAC, which includes 158 member states, requires member states to “develop
and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anticorruption policies” and “afford one
another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and
judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by [the] Convention.” See G.A. Res.
58/4, supra note 11, arts. 5, 46. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which
covers thirty-four states in South, Central, and North America, places similar legal
obligations on its members. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note
92, art. III ¶¶ 9, 10 (“State Parties agree to . . . create, maintain and strengthen . . . oversight
bodies with a view to implementing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting,
punishing and eradicating corrupt acts [and] [d]eterrents to the bribery of domestic and
foreign government officials.”); id. art. VIII (requiring prohibition and punishment of
transnational bribery); id. art. XIV (requiring mutual assistance and cooperation among
members). The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, which
includes forty-three African countries, contains similar provisions. See African Union, supra
note 94, art. 7 (committing members to disciplining and investigating acts of corruption by
public officials); id. art. 18 (“Parties shall provide each other with the greatest possible
technical cooperation and assistance . . . to prevent, detect, investigate and punish acts of
corruption.”).
217
In TI’s 2011 review of 183 countries, the vast majority of which have been party to
the UNCAC for nearly a decade, sixty countries were rated “highly corrupt” and an
additional forty-three were rated “corrupt.” See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION
PERCEPTIONS
INDEX
2011
(2011),
available
at
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/101/407/file/2011_CPI_EN.pdf.
218
According to TI’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, the world’s ten most corrupt
states, in order of increasing corruption (ranking from 172–82 out of 182) are: Venezuela,
216
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enforcement by free-riding off of U.S. and other advanced economies’
efforts to control the supply-side of bribes.
Conditionally transferring disgorgement to Host countries would
enable FCPA investigations to more efficiently uncover the underlying
wrongful acts by making Host countries stakeholders in the investigation
with an incentive to see it through as successfully as possible. 219 The
revenue generated by disgorgements could also be a valuable source of
funds for countries with otherwise limited resources and capacity to pursue
corruption investigations, and contribute to restricting the demand-side of
the corruption problem. Conditioning the transfer of disgorgement revenue
would not be a wholly novel policy approach, as the United States along
with the international organizations in which it plays a leading role already
condition fund transfers to foreign countries in other contexts. 220 The
strictness of conditionality could also be calibrated based on the importance
of obtaining Host country cooperation weighed against the value of
leveraging the OECD Working Group to increase the enforcement efforts of
other capital exporting economies.
1. The Critical Role of Host Countries in Corruption Investigations
Host countries play a critical role in corruption investigations and the
deterrence of transnational bribery more generally. They are responsible
for policing the demand-side of bribe-making221 and are also wellpositioned to supply valuable information to parties investigating the supply
of bribes in the Host jurisdiction. FCPA investigations are costly endeavors
that could greatly benefit from achieving more efficient access to
information.222 The investigations require U.S. Enforcement Agencies, and
the private law firms they enlist, to uncover secret payments that take place

Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and
Somalia. Id. By one measure, these countries are ranked 71, 157, 116, 135, 84, 121, 156,
151, n/a, and 172, respectively, in (purchasing power parity adjusted) gross domestic product
per capita.
GDP Per Capita PPP: Country List, TRADING ECON.,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-per-capita-ppp (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
219
Conditionality is a crucial feature of this proposal, because it would give Host
countries an incentive to cooperate in this investigation, rather than provide a windfall to
jurisdictions where bribery takes place.
220
See infra notes 258–60 and accompanying text.
221
The FCPA and OECD Convention apply only to bribe-giving persons or entities, and
do not impose penalties on public officials who are the recipients of bribes. See G.A. Res.
58/4, supra note 11, art. 5 (obligating member states to implement anti-corruption policies in
their jurisdictions).
222
A portion of the cost is reflected in the millions of dollars in fees charged by private
law firms that begin to conduct “internal investigations” of clients who have received
inquiries from the Enforcement Agencies. See First, supra note 124 (providing examples of
multi-million dollar FCPA investigations).
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in foreign jurisdictions, often coordinated among multiple actors. 223
Investigations are further complicated by the fact that the harm from
bribery is an intangible market distortion without a discrete “victim” in the
Host country, as might be the case for other forms of international business
malfeasance, such as fraud or environmental harms. 224 Finally, even when
a payment is identified, whether it constitutes a “bribe” is a fact-intensive
question that turns on the parties’ intentions and subsequent actions. 225
Host country assistance is valuable, because the characteristics of
FCPA investigations described above put information at a premium, and
Host countries are often situated as the lowest-cost providers of relevant
information.226 FCPA violations by definition involve a “public official” of
the Host country’s government. 227 Because many Host countries have
“mixed economies” without clear distinctions between public- and
privately-owned enterprises, disentangling the nature of a particular
individual’s connection to the government can be a complicated matter
requiring information primarily in the government’s hands. 228 The
requirement that a “foreign official” be involved also means that the vast
majority of investigations require uncovering actions taken within the
territory of the Host country. As a consequence, the cooperation of Host
countries is constantly solicited, with the SEC making hundreds of requests
to foreign authorities for enforcement assistance, and vice versa, each year,
including 1,264 requests in FY 2011.229 Thus, one commentator has
223
One recent example is the Tenaris case, which involved a European-based global
energy materials manufacturer, investigated for alleged bribes in Uzbekistan and the Caspian
Sea region, after the company was tipped by a customer dealing with a Tenaris agent outside
of Uzbekistan. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million
in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011112.htm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+sec%2Fl
gHO+%28SEC.gov+Updates%3A+Press+Releases%29; The SEC Uses an FCPA Case for
Its First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement, GIBSON DUNN (May 19, 2011)
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECUsesFCPACaseForFirstEverDeferredProsecutionAgreement.aspx.
224
In a typical bid-rigging case, for example, the public harm only appears in the form of
higher government expenditures resulting from the acceptance of otherwise uncompetitive
bids, and harm to competitors who lose the bid and may not know that the loss was due to a
bribe.
225
The FCPA defines a bribe vaguely to include “anything of value.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1
(2011); see also Berger, Sheehy & Davis, supra note 153 (explaining the definitional
ambiguity).
226
See Ashe, supra note 7, at 2916.
227
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
228
See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who Is a
Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1250 (2008).
229
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL J USTIFICATION 30
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf (showing requests for FY 2007
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summed up the scope of the problem well: “Gathering the evidence
necessary to carry out an investigation abroad is exceedingly difficult.
Indeed, if the United States was unable to elicit cooperation from local
agencies and officials, ‘[s]ecuring . . . proof [of official bribery] in a foreign
country would be practically impossible.’”230
Because FCPA investigations almost necessarily require coordination
among law enforcement agencies and local officials in Host countries, the
U.S. government has invested in a variety of programs and initiatives to
further this end.231 For example, the SEC has entered into over thirty
“bilateral information-sharing agreements” with regulators in other
countries,232 some of which have been invoked in the FCPA context. 233
Mutual legal assistance treaties are another more binding mechanism
serving a similar function, of which fifty-six were newly signed in 2008.234
These treaties are “intend[ed] to facilitate extradition of individuals charged
with transnational crimes and the sharing of information needed to
investigate and prosecute those crimes” 235 and will almost surely be used in
the FCPA context.236 Multilateral anti-bribery treaties to which the United
States is a party also uniformly contain major provisions on investigative

to FY2011); Gregory S. Bruch, Recent SEC Foreign Payments Cases and the Road Ahead
Under the New SEC Leadership, for the A.B.A. Center for Continuing Legal Educ., Nat’l
Inst. (Mar. 21–22, 2002), available at WL N02FCPB ABA-LGLED B-151 .
230
Ashe, supra note 7, at 2916 (quoting NEIL H. J ACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION
IN WORLD BUSINESS: A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD 218 (1977)).
231
See id. at 2916–17 (providing an overview of U.S. efforts to coordinate with Host
countries).
232
See id. at 2917 (explaining that the bilateral information-sharing agreements generally
“require: (1) the exchange, upon request, of information contained in the files of the foreign
regulator; (2) the taking of testimony under oath by the foreign regulator on behalf of the
SEC; (3) inspections of regulated persons by the foreign regulator; and (4) the sharing with
the SEC of the information and reports generated by those inspections”); ANNETTE L.
NAZARETH & PAUL F. ROYE, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 2004, at 543, 552 (2004).
233
See generally Bruch, supra note 229; DEVON ENERGY CORP., FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
POLICIES
AND
PROCEDURES
14
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dvn.com/CorporateGovernance/Documents/Foreign%20Corrupt%20Practices%2
0Act.PDF (publicly available corporate compliance document noting in reference to bilateral
agreements that “the international movement against official corruption has spawned new
cooperation mechanisms between U.S. enforcement officials and their foreign counterparts,
which significantly increase the risk of investigation and prosecution”).
234
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S./EU Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and
Extradition
Enter
into
Force
(Feb.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-opa-108.html.
235
Joseph P. Covington et al., New Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Facilitate
International Cooperation in FCPA Investigations, JENNER & BLOCK (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=46ee0d77-9133-44fc-8486-3a61c16d97b3.
236
Id.
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assistance and information sharing. 237 Also, in 2008, the FBI created an
International Corruption Unit to “oversee the increasing number of
corruption and fraud investigations with an international nexus requiring
extensive coordination with FBI field offices, legal attaché offices, U.S.
federal agencies, and the law enforcement agencies of Host countries.”238
The Executive Branch’s vigorous investment in these agreements and
programs underscores how critical a cooperative relationship with Host
countries is for successful foreign anti-bribery investigations.
Host countries often have the best access to critical information
relating to international corruption investigations. Accordingly, the U.S.
government has already taken a costly and multi-pronged approach to
securing the cooperation of Host countries. As Part IV.B argues infra, this
Article’s proposal to transfer disgorgement remedies would complement
efforts already in place and provide Host countries with both the resources
and incentives to comply.
2. Host Country Incentives and More Effective Enforcement
The potential to receive disgorged profits resulting from an FCPA
investigation would give Host countries a financial stake in the success of
investigations and a stronger incentive to discover and produce information
to U.S. Enforcement Agencies. It would also provide resources to Host
countries, allowing them to prioritize corruption enforcement and make
more general efforts to control the demand-side of corruption. Lastly, the
proposal would facilitate a more local approach that leverages the
efficiencies of domestic enforcement while mitigating concerns that FCPA
enforcement amounts to an act of cultural imperialism or functions as a de
facto sanction against lower-income countries.
Ideally, a foreign government will be public-regarding and concerned
with the corruption of its domestic officials. But even under this best-case
scenario, under-enforcement of anti-bribery prohibitions should be expected
to occur because of the free-rider problem.239 The opportunity for Host
countries to free-ride is a result of the bilateral nature of bribery; as game
theorist Kaushik Basu explains: “once a bribe is given, the bribe giver and
the bribe taker become partners in crime. It is in their joint interest to keep

237

G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11, art. 43, 43 I.L.M. at 30 (providing requirements
concerning “international cooperation”); OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 9, 37 I.L.M.
at 10 (providing requirements concerning “Mutual Legal Assistance”).
238
See Bridget M. Rhode & Steve Ganis, Foreign Corrupt Practices ACT (FCPA) Alert:
The DoJ’s FCPA Crackdown on the Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Industry, MINTZ
LEVIN (Sept. 2010), http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2010/Advisories/0665-0910-NATWC/web.html.
239
See generally The Free Rider Problem, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 21, 2003),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/.
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this fact hidden from the authorities and to be fugitives from the law,
because, if caught, both expect to be punished.” 240 The bilateral bribe
relationship means that virtually any U.S. Enforcement Agency
investigation into the supply-side of bribes will also uncover information
about the demand-side misbehavior of foreign public officials. Thus, U.S.
investigative activity carries a non-excludable benefit, or positive
externality,241 for Host countries that have a preference for deterring bribery
and regard corruption control as a public good. A conscientious foreign
government that seeks to discipline its bureaucracy will therefore have an
incentive to free-ride off of the enforcement investment by the United
States in “FBI field offices[and] . . . legal attaché offices,”242 and the like.
Importantly, this dynamic will not be limited to the context of a particular
investigation and would also apply over time to induce a more general
under-investment in domestic institutions capable of policing the demandside of bribery.243
While transferring disgorgement still constitutes an investment on the
part of the United States, its conditionality can reduce free-riding.
Conditionality means that supply-side investigations in foreign countries
would carry a benefit from which the Host country could be excluded if it
did not cooperate: withdrawal of disgorged profits would then be a cost of
non-cooperation that the Host country “internalizes.” 244 Proceeding from
the assumption that states at least some of the time rationally respond to the
240

Kaushik Basu, Why, For a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe Should Be
Treated as Legal 5 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/Act_Giving_Bribe_Legal.pdf.
241
See generally Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, in THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 1st ed. 1993), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html (“Externalities occur
when one person’s actions affect another person’s well-being and the relevant costs and
benefits are not reflected in market prices. . . . Note that the free-rider problem and positive
externalities are two sides of the same coin.”); Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics,
17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (providing a seminal treatment of the free-rider problem by
examining the excludability of lighthouse services in England).
242
See Rhode & Ganis, supra note 238.
243
See Kevin E. Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing
Countries? 16 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 09-52, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520553 (“Suppose that victims of corruption could
rely on foreign police forces, prosecutors, lawyers, and courts to investigate, prosecute and
adjudicate complaints of bribery and to levy criminal or civil sanctions. In that case, why
would those victims invest any effort in complaining about or pressing for the improvement
of local courts, and so on?”).
244
See Cowen, supra note 241 (providing a roughly analogous example in the private
sector context: “If the research and development activities of one firm benefit other firms in
the same industry, these firms may pool their resources and agree to a joint project (antitrust
regulations permitting). Each firm will pay part of the cost, and the contributing firms will
share the benefits. In this context economists say that the externalities are ‘internalized.’”).
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costs and benefits of various policies, it is likely that providing Host
countries a financial stake in the success of investigations would induce
cooperation more readily than signing any number of “bilateral information
sharing agreements” would. 245 At the same time, conditionality would
complement legal agreements already in place, which could serve as
guidance as to which forms of Host country assistance are expected and
considered to constitute “cooperation” for purposes of receiving disgorged
profits.246
A policy of conditionally transferring disgorgement may also help
fund the efforts of Host countries—which often have limited resources or
capacity to prioritize anti-corruption programs and investigations—to
constrain the demand-side of bribery more generally. 247 Transfer of
proceeds could conceivably be accompanied by a further condition that they
are spent on corruption reform. Even if such a level of micromanagement is
undesirable, or might not be realistically enforced, such transfers may
increase attention to corruption in two ways. One mechanism is through a
governmental “wealth effect,”248 in which an increased government budget
leads to increased expenditures on “normal” public goods across the
board,249 including corruption control. Second, one would expect transfers
in some cases to be channeled disproportionately towards demand-side
corruption control, because a successful investigation and the
accompanying disgorgement revenue could increase the status and
influence of leaders favoring investigative cooperation and provide
momentum for more general reform of the Host country’s bureaucracy. 250

245
To be precise, a perfectly rational government would be willing to spend no more on
investigative assistance than the present-discounted value of any ill-gotten profits multiplied
by the probability of receiving such profits from the United States. See supra note 233 and
accompanying text (describing the proliferation of bilateral information sharing agreements).
246
See infra note 307 and accompanying text (explaining the analogous “definitional”
role of legal instruments in the treaty context).
247
See generally Joarder Mohammad Abdul Munim, Fiscal Capacity and MultipleEquilibria of Corruption: Cross-Country Evidence, 24 J. INT’L DEV. 34 (2012) (finding
evidence of a positive relationship between a state’s “revenue capacity” and its ability to
control corruption).
248
“Wealth effect” is an economic term that refers to an increase in spending that
accompanies an increase in perceived wealth. See Michael R. Darby, Wealth Effect, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 883–85 (1987).
249
A “normal good” is any good with a positive income elasticity of demand, or in other
words, any good for which, given constant prices, demand increases when income increases
and falls when income decreases. Corruption-free government, like public safety or
environmental quality, is almost certainly a normal public good in the sense that jurisdictions
with higher incomes demand more investment in reducing corruption. See, e.g.,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 217 (showing a clear correlation between national income
and levels of corruption).
250
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 199–212 (describing a set of conditions
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Even a modest increase in resources expended on demand-side
corruption control may produce substantial results. The more realistic
models of corruption take into account historical attitudes towards
corruption and predict that different social expectations about the incidence
of corruption can “generate multiple equilibria whereby organizations or
societies with the same institutional characteristics can experience very
different corruption levels.”251 An important implication of the multiple
equilibria feature of corruption is that a mere temporary increase in
domestic enforcement efforts can have a lasting effect on corruption levels,
as a one-time “cleanup campaign” can shift the expectations of government
officials and tip a bureaucracy from a high-corruption equilibrium to a lowcorruption equilibrium. 252 Furthermore, a low-corruption equilibrium may
be stable even after reducing enforcement resources. 253 Confirmation of
these principles in actual “big push” anti-corruption campaigns has been
found in diverse settings, such as the Italian judiciary, public hospitals in
Argentina, and Hong Kong soon after the establishment of its Independent
Commission Against Corruption.254
In addition to facilitating direct enforcement efforts, disgorgement
transfers could also supply a source of funds for the somewhat unseemly
but often very necessary process of compensating the “losers” from
domestic anti-corruption policies.255 One example of compensation is “civil
service reform where salaries and working conditions are improved in

under which democratic and autocratic leaders may find pro-reform positions to be in their
personal interest).
251
Toke S. Aidt, Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey, 113 ECON. J. F632, F647
(2003).
252
See Mark Kleiman & Beau Kilmer, The Dynamics of Deterrence, 106 PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 14230, 14230 (2009) (“If potential offenders are sufficiently
deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce
the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by “tipping” a situation from its high-violation
equilibrium
to
its
low-violation
equilibrium.”),
available
at
http://www.pnas.org/content/106/34/14230.full.pdf+html; Francis T. Lui, A Dynamic Model
of Corruption Deterrence, 31 J. PUB. ECON. 215, 232 (1986).
253
ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 56 (“Once a new low corruption equilibrium has
been established, it can be maintained with reduced enforcement resources.”); see also
Olivier Cadot, Corruption as a Gamble, 33 J. PUB. ECON. 223 (1987).
254
Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, The Role of Wages and Auditing During a
Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires, 46 J.L. & ECON. 269 (2003) (detailing
the Argentine experience in the 1990s); Max J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating
Corruption: Hong Kong’s ICAC, 547 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118 (1996)
(covering Hong Kong); Antonio Acconcia & Claudia Cantabene, A Big Push to Deter
Corruption: Evidence from Italy (Ctr. for Studies in Econs. & Fin., Working Paper No. 159,
2008) (covering Italy).
255
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 219–22 (arguing that side-payments to
corrupt officials exiting the bureaucracy are often required to “sustain reform”).
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return for officials forgoing bribery receipts.” 256 Such a side-payment may
be effective in high-bribery countries where tolerating bribery is often
considered a part of remuneration for an otherwise under-paid bureaucracy.
Another mechanism could take the form of “golden handshakes,” with
which support for shrinking a predatory public sector is won through a onetime windfall offered to exiting civil servants.257
Understood most broadly, transferring revenue to the Host country
would imply a more local approach to anti-bribery enforcement.258 The
proposal would thereby meet several “powerful objections to the idea of
relying on foreign legal institutions to perform roles that might, at least in
principle, be played by domestic ones.” 259 For reasons concerning access to
information described in Part IV.A.i, it is likely that deploying local
resources would often be more efficient than deploying foreign resources.260
Development of domestic anti-corruption institutions also facilitates a
process of “learning-by-doing” and reduces the potential that “foreign
institutions will serve as substitutes for displaced domestic institutions that
may, even if only over time, offer equal or even superior performance.” 261
A final advantage of this proposal and its local approach is that
incorporating Host countries as financial partners in bribery investigations
would in part meet the critique that foreign anti-bribery efforts are
indifferent or hostile to Host country interests. 262 Criticisms of this sort
often argue that the imposition of Western definitions of bribery constitutes
an act of “cultural imperialism.” 263 Another strain of commentary focuses

256

Id. at 219.
Id.
258
Cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945)
(emphasizing the efficiency gains from using local knowledge to allocate resources through
the price mechanism).
259
Davis, supra note 243 at 3. Davis, a law and development scholar, develops three
categories of objections: (1) foreign institutions may have motivations that are indifferent or
hostile to the Host country’s welfare; (2) foreign institutions may provide solutions
incompatible with local institutions and norms; and (3) foreign interventions may substitute
for or displace domestic efforts that may prove superior over time. Id. at 3–4.
260
This argument tracks Davis’s “incompatibility” category of objections. See id. at 13–
15.
261
Id. at 4. For a condensed version of Davis’s “institutional displacement” objection,
see id. at 15–17.
262
See id. at 11–13 (outlining the “indifference” objection).
263
See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global
Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419 (1999); but see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 177
(arguing that this view is condescending: “many scholars from developing countries argue
that this fashionable [cultural imperialism] critique is based on a mischaracterization of local
practices. They make it clear that traditions of gift giving do not translate into widespread
acceptance of corrupt practices. Citizen surveys and expression of public outrage suggests
that widespread tolerance of corruption is not common.”).
257
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on the sanction-like effect of FCPA enforcement and the economic harm it
may impose on Host countries.264 Making Host countries financial and
enforcement co-partners in corruption investigations would reduce the
perception that efforts to eliminate corruption are acts of cultural or
economic hegemony.
3. Potential Criticisms and Summary
Allocating disgorgement proceeds to the Host country instead of the
U.S. Treasury via the SEC is a simple proposal that becomes more
complicated and vulnerable to criticism at the implementation phase.
However, conditioning the transfer of disgorgement revenue would not be a
wholly novel policy approach. The United States modified its traditional
foreign aid policy in 2002 with the Millennium Challenge Account, a
program intended to screen out countries likely to waste foreign funds while
channeling aid to those nations who will use the assistance for the benefit of
their populations.265 This Article’s proposal merely consists of an
application of this general approach to the specific context of anti-bribery
enforcement.266 And in fact, the SEC is already statutorily authorized to set
up a “fund” to transfer disgorgement proceeds to third parties through the
Fair Funds provisions of SOX.267 The disgorgement policy put forward
here would apply this basic mechanism to set up a fund for Host countries
that likely suffer more harm from FCPA violations than investors in
corporations guilty of foreign bribery,268 an approach the U.K. has
experimented with under its recent Bribery Act.269
An obvious concern is that some of the Host countries where FCPA
investigations take place are ruled by “kleptocratic” governments that have
no interest in deterring corruption and function primarily to extract
resources from the general population.270 Kleptocracies, as well as
countries with antagonistic diplomatic relationships with the United
264

See Spalding, supra note 7.
See generally Margaret Dennis, A New Approach to Foreign Aid: A Case Study of the
Millennium Challenge Account (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Emerging Scholars Paper No.
12, 2008), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/Dennis.ESP12-08.pdf.
266
2010 was the SEC’s highest “grossing” year for disgorgement, yielded roughly $500
million in settlements. See supra notes 47, 72–75, and accompanying text.
267
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011); see also Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1366(a), 18 U.S.C. § 981(i) (2011) (amended 2012)
(providing for civil or criminal forfeiture of property and transfer to eligible foreign
countries that participated in the seizure of that property).
268
See supra notes 61, 63 and accompanying paragraph.
269
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
270
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 114 (distinguishing between “kleptocracies
where corruption is organized at the top of government and other states where bribery is the
province of a large number of low-level officials”).
265
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States,271 could be identified272 and made ineligible for disgorgement funds.
Making these countries ineligible need not eviscerate the policy. In the
past, many Host countries subject to FCPA investigations have been
middle-income nations with relatively non-parasitic governments that do
not rise to the level of kleptocracy. 273
Another concern is the sheer magnitude of transfers that could be
implicated. In 2010, the SEC’s highest “grossing” year for disgorgement,
settlements yielded roughly $500 million, an inarguably large amount of
money.274 However, this number pales in comparison to the total amount of
U.S. Agency for International Development funds disbursed that same year,
which totaled around $43 billion.275 The amount actually transferred to
Host countries should be expected to be less than the $500 million figure,
because: (1) 2010 was a “banner” year for the SEC; 276 (2) removing the
money from the U.S. coffers should discourage the SEC’s increasingly
inflated disgorgement calculations; 277 and (3) not all Host countries will be
cooperative or otherwise eligible for disgorgement transfers.
Conditionally granting disgorgement proceeds to cooperative Host
countries with functioning governments would make foreign anti-bribery
enforcement more effective. Free-riding off U.S. investments in antibribery investigations could be reduced as Host countries with unique
access to investigation-relevant information are incentivized to become
partners in the investigation. The proceeds from successful investigations
271
See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EFFECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON
DEMOCRACY BUILDING: RESULTS OF A CROSS-NATIONAL QUANTITATIVE STUDY 14, 19–22,
30–32 (2006), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnade694.pdf (providing tables of
countries with incomes making them “eligible” for U.S. Agency for International
Development funds, but receiving none).
272
An easy starting point for identifying kleptocracies could be by reference to the
lowest rankings on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. See
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 217.
273
See, e.g., Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64,978 (July 27, 2011), available at
http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=31a9b4d349230e5ee7b20283a081f9e
2 (noting that the SEC alleged that the international beverage distributor Diageo made
prohibited payments to public officials in India, Thailand, and South Korea). Certainly
South Korea is a relatively wealthy and well-functioning democracy that cannot fairly be
described as a “kleptocracy.” See generally James Mintz Grp., Where The Bribes Are,
FCPA MAP, http://www.fcpamap.com (tracking global incidence of FCPA penalties) (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013).
274
See supra note 47 (providing the dollar breakdown of the 2010 SEC settlements).
275
See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY, FUNCTION 150 &
OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2011), available at
http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/156214.pdf.
276
See Koehler, supra note 137 (describing 2010 as the FCPA’s “biggest” and “boldest”
to date). 2011 saw only a slight drop off in FCPA penalties compared to 2010. See Berger
et al., supra note 81.
277
See supra note 168 and accompanying paragraph.
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could also be a springboard for more general efforts by the Host
government to begin curbing the demand-side of bribery. Host countries
taking a greater role in the enforcement effort would also help quell
concerns that anti-bribery enforcement is a form of Western cultural
imperialism or de facto sanctions.
Finally, the stringency of the
“cooperation” threshold could be calibrated to reflect the appropriate
tradeoff between the importance of Host country assistance and the value
derived from transferring more resources to international organizations
tasked with coordinating the enforcement of supply-side states.
B. Disgorgement to International Organizations
The under-enforcement problem does not only, or even primarily,
afflict Host countries responsible for policing the demand-side of
corruption.
Almost all of the world’s capital-exporting advanced
economies are members of the OECD and parties to the OECD Convention,
a treaty patterned largely after the FCPA that requires members to prosecute
legal persons responsible for supplying bribes to foreign jurisdictions. 278
With the exception of the United States, and the U.K. since 2011,
compliance with the OECD Convention has been tepid at best.279
Lackluster enforcement of the supply-side of bribery by OECD members is
not due to a defect in the language or provisions of the OECD Convention.
Instead, structural features of the treaty create a collective action problem in
which each member state has the incentive to strategically under-enforce
foreign bribery by its nationals.
The final part of this Article’s proposal is to transfer proceeds from
FCPA disgorgement to the OECD Working Group—the entity that was
established to monitor the implementation of the OECD Convention 280—
when cooperation by a Host country is not forthcoming. The collective
action problem created by the treaty makes effective enforcement critically
depend on member states’ ability to monitor one another’s compliance. In
the specific context of international business corruption, international
organizations such as the Working Group can be particularly useful in
facilitating international anti-bribery efforts and making the OECD
278

OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 2 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may
be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons
for the bribery of a foreign public official.”); see also Westbrook, supra note 2, at 511 (“The
OECD Convention requires signatory countries to enact measures that are substantively
similar to the prohibitions in the FCPA . . . .”).
279
See infra note 288 and accompanying paragraph.
280
See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 12 (“Monitoring and Follow-Up: The
Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and
promote the full implementation of this Convention. Unless otherwise decided by consensus
of the Parties, this shall be done in the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery
in International Business Transactions and according to its terms of reference . . . .”).
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Convention more effective because of their monitoring and information
aggregating functions. This approach—which enables states to more
efficiently self-police compliance with their treaty commitments—is likely
to be more successful than various proposals to create more treaties,
strengthen treaty language, or empower international organizations with a
more direct, prosecutorial role for which they are ill-suited.
1. The Failure of Multilateral Enforcement
While the U.S. government has unilaterally ratcheted up its antibribery enforcement through investigations under the FCPA, it has also
aggressively lobbied on the international level for a multilateral approach to
anti-corruption. 281 The importance of a multilateral approach is often
expressed as the need for an “even playing field” among multinational
corporations: if only U.S. corporations are subject to anti-bribery laws, they
will be disadvantaged in foreign markets when competing against
companies that are not so constrained.282 A lack of multilateralism not only
comes at a cost to the U.S. economy, but also makes efforts to reduce
corruption generally less efficacious. This is because the unilateral
withdrawal of U.S. corporate investment from jurisdictions where bribery
takes place will only induce corporations from capital-exporting countries
that less actively enforce bribery to move in to fill the economic void. 283
The United States has largely been successful in its effort at forging
international agreements to combat foreign bribery; 284 multilateral
enforcement, on the other hand, has lagged considerably behind the signing
of international conventions. 285 In 2009, Transparency International
281

See Ashe, supra note 7, at 2908 (“[W]ithout an international agreement in place, U.S.
interests were suffering significantly despite the 1988 amendments, especially in emerging
markets. U.S. efforts to get the international community on board continued through the
1990s.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547 (legislative comment to 1988 Amendments exhorting the U.S.
government to pursue an international anti-bribery convention).
282
See Presidential Statement, supra note 42 (“U.S. companies have had to compete on
an uneven playing field, resulting in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion
per year.”); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 674 (“U.S. business interests argued for substantial
modification or repeal of the FCPA so as to create a ‘level playing field’ in international
markets.”).
283
See Spalding, supra note 7, at 397; James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign
Bribery and American Business After 1977, at 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5266, 1995) (finding that the FCPA encouraged “ownership
substitution” in the 1970s between U.S. investors—the only investors subject to anti-bribery
legislation at the time—and foreign investors).
284
See supra notes 92–95 (listing the handful of anti-bribery treaties that have
proliferated in recent years).
285
See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666, 682–83 (“The wave of international arrangements
raises the question of why, after many barren years, anti-corruption initiatives bore so much
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reported that only three of the thirty-seven non-U.S. parties to the OECD
Convention (Germany, Norway, Switzerland) had actively enforced their
anti-corruption laws, while twenty-one had seen little or no enforcement.286
Even this estimate may over-state the total amount of activity, however, as
the patches of enforcement that have occurred are primarily from an outlier
case involving the U.N. oil-for-food scandal.287 Progress has not been
substantial since TI’s 2009 report, and its 2011 report concluded that “there
has been no progress since TI’s 2010 progress report in the number of
countries with active enforcement.”288
The disjunction between readily joining anti-bribery treaties and
subsequently not complying with them reflects a rational calculation on the
part of OECD member states. 289 Simply agreeing to join anti-corruption
conventions is relatively costless if it is not accompanied by a genuine
commitment to invest in compliance. 290 In addition, ratification may carry
certain non-trivial “expressive” benefits that follow from taking positions
consistent with values encouraged by the international community. 291 For
this reason, states often sign treaties, including the OECD Convention, in
order to signal cooperation, while simultaneously having little or no
intention to comply.292

fruit so quickly. The ineffectiveness of the arrangements raises the question of why the
apparent commitment of state and non-state actors to combat corruption dissipated after the
international agreements were signed.”).
286
FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2009:
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 8 (2009).
287
Id. at 4 (“Many of the cases and investigations mentioned in . . . this report relate to
the Oil-for-Food Programme that was established by the United Nations (UN) Security
Council in 1995 and began operation at the end of 1996.”).
288
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 214.
289
See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 2002 (2002) (“[C]ountries will comply with treaties only when doing so enhances their
interests, whether those interests are defined in terms of geopolitical power, reputation, or
domestic impact.”).
290
Id. at 2006 (“And where there is little enforcement, the costs of [treaty] membership
are also small, as countries with policies that do not adhere to the requirements of the treaty
are unlikely to be penalized.”).
291
See id. at 2005 (“In this sense [of expressing agreement with the basic values of the
treaty], the ratification of a treaty functions much as a roll-call vote in the U.S. Congress or a
speech in favor of the temperance movement, as a pleasing statement not necessarily
intended to have any real effect on outcomes.”).
292
Marco Celentani, Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose-Luis Peydro, Combating Corruption in
International Business Transactions, 71 ECONOMICA 417, 418 (2004) (“[R]ecent evidence on
the OECD Convention clarifies that a country that signs a convention may in the end choose
not to enforce it. This in turn implies that the meaningful decision is not whether to sign the
Convention or not, but rather whether or not to enforce it.”); Hathaway, supra note 289, at
2006 (providing a statistical study that finds a weak but positive correlation between signing
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The incentive structure facing signatory states changes once the
question becomes expending resources to actually comply with the treaty.
At the compliance stage, international efforts to enforce anti-bribery rules
through the OECD Convention have not materialized, because the
Convention is subject to the same collective action problems that plague
many other multilateral agreements. Specifically, Daniel Tarullo and
others293 have modeled members of international anti-bribery conventions
as facing a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma
dynamic294 means that each state’s dominant strategy 295 is to shirk on
deterring the bribery of its domestic corporations while at the same time
reaping the benefits of any enforcement by other members against their own
companies.296
The basic prisoner’s dilemma analysis 297 is on the whole persuasive,
but incomplete in that it cannot explain the United States’ increasing
willingness to pursue FCPA enforcement. 298 The explanation is likely not
that the United States is uniquely harmed by its nationals’ bribery. Instead,
the United States is probably an outlier because of its ability to unilaterally
“even the playing field” by regularly investigating foreign companies and
funding its prosecutorial efforts through penalties disproportionately levied

human rights treaties and committing human right abuses, and concluding, “Where there is
little monitoring, noncompliance is not likely to be exposed. Therefore, the countries that
join the treaty will enjoy the expressive benefits of joining the treaty, regardless of whether
they actually comply with the treaty’s requirements.”).
293
See generally Davis, supra note 12, at 27 (“[Policing bribery] creates a form of
prisoners’ dilemma for payor states: it may be possible for them to maximize their collective
welfare by penalising some forms of transnational bribery; however, it may not be in the best
interests of any individual state to act unilaterally because of the adverse competitive
implications.”); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666; COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.
CITY BAR, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 14–16
(2011).
294
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, G AME THEORY
AND THE LAW 33–34 (Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 1998) (providing a narrative
explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma game); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY:
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 97 (1997) (providing a more mathematical explication).
295
In game theory, a “dominant strategy” is any course of action which makes an actor
better off than alternative strategies, regardless of the actions of any other participants in the
game. See BAIRD, supra note 294, at 11–12.
296
See COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, supra note 293; Davis, supra note 12, at 27;
Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666.
297
See generally Davis, supra note 12, at 41–43; Tarullo, supra note 12.
298
Tarullo’s analysis awkwardly treats the United States’ commitment to enforcement
alternatively as a given, or as a result of mid-1970s scandals and the push for an OECD
Convention in the 1990s. See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 668–80. But this repeats the
mistake of conflating the incentives to sign anti-bribery laws with the incentives to actually
enforce them.
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on non-U.S. entities. 299 However, the singular position of the United States,
and now possibly the U.K.,300 does not alter the strategic incentives of the
vast majority of OECD member states. Thus, the essential non-compliance
by member states other than the United States remains a core problem with
the OECD Convention, preventing it from being effective.
2. Enforcing Collective Action
The prisoner’s dilemma dynamic is a general problem that impedes
collective enforcement of the OECD Convention as well as many other
ambitious treaty agreements301 that attempt to govern the provision of
international public goods.302
Collective action problems on the
international level can be extremely difficult to solve, because the
international system is essentially anarchic, 303 in that there is no central
world-governmental authority in a position to punish states for failure to

299

Recall that ninety percent of the dollar value of FCPA penalties in 2010 were imposed
on non-U.S. companies. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. Recall also that nine of
the ten largest FCPA penalties ever have been imposed against non-U.S. corporations, and
that every investigation initiated in 2011 was against a foreign corporation. See Berger et al.,
supra note 81.
300
The unilateralism calculus may apply to the U.K. after passage of its 2010 Bribery Act
as “[t]he jurisdictional reach of the Act extends beyond the UK, and Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) officials who will be prosecuting violations of the Act have signaled their intention to
assert broad jurisdiction . . . .” Roger M. Witten et al., Preparing for Doing Business Under
the
UK
Bribery
Act,
WILMER
HALE
(Oct.
6,
2010),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9614; see also
U.K. Bribery Act, c. 23, § 19 (2010).
301
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87
(2005) (arguing that international agreements concerning “true international public goods
such as the protection of fisheries, the reduction of atmospheric pollution, and peace . . . are
multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas, not coordination games”); ANDREW G UZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 29–33 (2008).
302
A corruption-free global marketplace is an “international public good” in the sense
that “payers and nonpayers receive its benefits, and one person’s consumption does not
necessarily reduce the benefits still available to others from the same unit of the good.”
Todd Sandler, Financing International Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INCENTIVES, MEASUREMENT, AND FINANCING 81, 81 (Marco Ferroni & Ashoka Mody eds.,
2002).
303
See Andrew Moravcsik & Frank Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY 67, 68 (Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez eds., 2d ed. 2009)
(arguing in the European context that “[t]he EU, like other international institutions, can
profitably be studied by treating states as the critical actors in the context of anarchy”);
Robert Hudec, “Transcending the Ostensible”: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation
Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 212 (1988) (“[I]nternational legal
arrangements have relatively more in common with the law of primitive societies studied by
anthropologists, in which litigation is still emerging as a rather tenuous alternative to dispute
resolution by force.”).
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comply with their international legal obligations. 304 As a consequence,
states participating in multilateral treaty regimes are forced to engage in a
decentralized process of mutual-policing by imposing costs or providing
benefits to other member states in order to change the positive payoff
associated with free-riding on treaty commitments.305
A prerequisite of this decentralized enforcement process is overcoming
the informational and monitoring problem of determining when the actions
of a member state constitute non-compliance.306 A treaty agreement itself
serves the vital definitional role of laying out an abstract legal standard for
what constitutes compliance on the part of signatories. 307 However, it
leaves unanswered the often more complex factual question of which
particular real-world acts of treaty members fall within the legal rule, which
is a question that can only be answered through investment in collecting
information on state behavior.308
Monitoring compliance with international anti-corruption conventions
is more difficult than monitoring compliance is for most international
economic agreements. In the case of breaches of free trade agreements, for
example, it is not overly difficult for states to identify when their exports
are subject to tariffs or other trade barriers by treaty partners. 309 Compare
instances of under-enforcement of the OECD Convention’s anti-bribery
provisions, where the relevant activity involves secretive transactions and
turns on complicated facts, and where treaty members must be expected to

304

See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 7 (2009) (“At the international
level, no world government exists, and so no entity has the power to tax and regulate states,
or the individuals who live in them, in order to ensure that collective goods are produced.”).
305
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 301, at 86 (“To solve collective action problems,
players must be able to monitor each other and commit to punishing any player who freerides, and that includes any player who fails to punish another player who free-rides.”).
Whether this is through material threats and promises or moral suasion, the underlying
analysis remains the same. See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 690–91.
306
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 301.
307
Id. at 85 (“In repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, when the [international treaty] agreement
sets out clearly what counts as a cooperative action, unintended defections are reduced, and
it becomes more difficult for a state to engage in opportunism and then deny that the action
violated the requirements of a cooperative game.”).
308
Id. at 86.
309
See Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged? 1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
No.
3540,
2005),
available
at
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&p
iPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000012009_20050317142750 (“That such a
large share of the WTO dispute settlement caseload involves challenges to antidumping,
countervailing duties and safeguards is perhaps not surprising, given the relative
transparency of these policies . . . .”).
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exercise a degree of prosecutorial discretion. 310 For these reasons, and
because of the necessary role of monitoring in enforcing compliance with
multilateral treaties, it is accurate to say that “[t]he most obvious
shortcoming of current institutional arrangements under the OECD
Convention is the absence of information flows about specific instances of
bribery.”311
Once investment in monitoring is sufficient to identify acts of
compliance and non-compliance, there remains the problem of inducing
non-enforcing treaty partners to perform by ensuring that the benefits of
compliance exceed its cost. One mechanism through which monitoring can
change states’ cost-benefit calculus is the production of “reputational
effects.”312 Monitoring disseminates information about a state’s propensity
to comply with its international commitments, and thereby affects its
reputation for compliance. A reputation for compliance can be a valuable
asset, because states with reputations for cheating on commitments will
have their promises discounted and will not be able to credibly commit to
future cooperative endeavors.313 Thus, monitoring of state behavior
encourages compliance by creating a cost to non-compliance that would not
otherwise exist.
A more direct vehicle for re-aligning the cost-benefit considerations of
treaty partners is the delivery of “side-payments,” which increase the
benefits of compliance. In bargaining theory, “once the value-maximizing
agreement is identified, parties that prefer the status quo (or some
alternative agreement) can be compensated with a transfer or cash or
something else”314 in order to secure performance under the agreement.
Such transfers are referred to as side-payments, and can be used to
“[i]ncrease the payoff for a government’s prosecuting overseas bribery by
310

See generally Tarullo, supra note 12, at 689 (“Bribery takes place in the shadows. It
may never be visible to anyone but the immediate actors. Where there are hints of bribery,
investigations backed with some form of compulsory process may be necessary to establish
the case that a signatory is obliged to take action. Finally, even if there is information
available . . . [i]t may not be an easy matter to distinguish instances of good faith nonprosecution from instances where prosecutors have ignored overseas commercial bribery in
order to boost the competitive position of their country’s firms.”).
311
Tarullo, supra note 12, at 695.
312
See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 1823, 1861–64 (2002) (discussing reputational sanctions as an enforcement
mechanism); see generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 231 (2009) (providing an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of reputation
as an analytical tool in international legal scholarship).
313
See GUZMAN, supra note 301, at 34–35.
314
Id. at 166; see also Roman M. Sheremeta & Erik O. Kimbrough, Side-Payments and
the Costs of Conflict (Feb. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Maastricht
University School of Business’s Department of Economics), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999090.
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credibly promising rewards to that government,” 315 which Tarullo identifies
as one of “three broad strategies that might be pursued alone or in
combination to induce other governments to enforce their anti-bribery
laws.”316
Rationalist theories of international law and international relations
view international organizations as most successful when functioning as
information-producing institutions. 317
The information produced by
international organizations can be used by states to monitor the compliance
of counterparties to those agreements. International organizations can also
serve as mechanisms for states to transfer side-payments to treaty partners
for whom the benefits of compliance would not otherwise exceed the costs.
As the next subpart will show, the OECD Working Group is an
international organization well-positioned to perform both roles.
3. OECD Working Group’s Role in Improving Enforcement
While other, analogous international organizations could also be
considered,318 the OECD Working Group is a natural candidate for
receiving disgorgement funds, as it was specifically designed to address the
collective action problem described above. 319 Funding the Working Group
would also be broadly consistent with the foreign policy prerogatives of the
United States, as the Working Group is the product of a treaty that was
modeled after the FCPA and which came into being largely through U.S.

315

See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 690–91.
Id.
317
See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 17, 92 (1984) (“The policy implications of the book stem most directly
from my emphasis on the value of information produced and distributed by international
regimes . . . . From the perspective of market-failure theories, the informational functions of
regimes are the most important of all.”); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A
Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 179–80 (2008) (“This observation—that
tribunals serve to provide information—guides the analysis that follows. The goal here is to
develop a theory capable of explaining how information can influence state behavior and
encourage compliance with international law.”).
318
The closest alternative would be the Conference of States Parties (CoSP) established
under the UNCAC. See G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11, art. 63.1 (“A Conference of the
States Parties to the Convention is hereby established to improve the capacity of and
cooperation between States Parties to achieve the objectives set forth in this Convention and
to promote and review its implementation.”).
319
See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION
& DEV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/antibriberyconvention/40896091.pdf (“The Working Group’s most important role is to support
country-level implementation of the OECD anti-bribery instruments. The monitoring
process aims to ensure that all Parties have in place a sound system to fight foreign bribery
that complies with the Convention’s high standards.”).
316
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initiative.320 Furthermore, the United States plays a leading role in the
Working Group’s parent organization, the OECD, and could expect to
retain significant influence over the programs and priorities to which
disgorged funds are directed.321
The core function of the Working Group is to gather the information
necessary to monitor and evaluate member states’ compliance with the
OECD Convention.322 This involves country visits by experts from peer
governments and meetings with local prosecutors and representatives from
the private sector and civil society.323 Reviews also “probe OECD states to
determine whether their governments have legal loopholes (such as short
statutes of limitations), whether they provide sufficient resources for
enforcement, and whether local corporations have adequate compliance
programs.”324
The Working Group evaluates each member state and develops
individual country reports through a three phase process: Phase 1 evaluates
the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the Convention; 325
Phase 2 assesses whether a country is applying this legislation
effectively;326 and Phase 3 focuses on enforcement of the Convention, the

320
Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On, 5
MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (2008) (“The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to
combat corruption of foreign public officials was pressure applied by the United States
(US).”); see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S161–62; cf. Ashe, supra note 7, at
2908–09 (explaining other factors that bolstered U.S. efforts).
321
For example, the United States contributed nearly twenty-two percent of the OECD’s
general 2012 budget, the largest amount among member states by a wide margin. Member
Countries’ Budget Contributions for 2012, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/membercountriesbudgetcontributionsfor2012.htm
(last
visited Jan. 3, 2013).
322
See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 12 (“Monitoring and Follow-Up: The
Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and
promote the full implementation of this Convention. [T]his shall be done in the framework
of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and
according to its terms of reference.”).
323
Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN
AFF., May/June 2006, at 75, 80.
324
Id.
325
Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2022613_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013) (“The principal objective of Phase 1 is to evaluate whether the legal
texts through which participants implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention meet the
standard set by the Convention.”).
326
Phase 2 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION
&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2022939_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Jan. 2, 2013).
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2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation, and outstanding recommendations
from Phase 2.327 To date, these efforts are incomplete but nonetheless
substantial: over two-thirds of all OECD parties have been reviewed. 328
Also, this review has not been without teeth, as the Working Group “has
demonstrated its credibility by criticizing the [C]onvention’s inadequate
implementation in major countries such as France, Japan, Italy, and the
United Kingdom.”329 Transferring disgorged profits to the Working Group
would provide the resources necessary for it to pursue its current
monitoring activities in a deeper and more complete manner.
With more funding, the current functions of the Working Group could
also be expanded or made more robust. Noting the limitations of the
backgrounds of current Working Group officials, 330 Tarullo proposes
establishing a sub-group of prosecutors within the Working Group, with its
role outlined as follows:
The direct objectives of an OECD committee of prosecutors would
be to ensure: first, efficient exchanges of information pertaining to
specific instances of bribery and, second, good faith investigation by
the home-country prosecutors of companies implicated by such
information . . . Relationships might [also] be initiated with legal
authorities in host countries so as to facilitate the collection of
evidence.331

The OECD has not yet created a standing committee of prosecutors, but it
has taken initial steps to coordinate with prosecutors, private sector and
civil society groups, and other international anti-corruption organizations.332
These efforts could be formalized and deepened.
Another possibility is to use disgorgement funds to establish inflows of
information from untapped sources, such as TI and competing multinational

327

Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. CO&
DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“The Working Group on Bribery adopted a post-Phase 2 assessment
mechanism in December 2009, to act as a permanent cycle of peer review, involving
systematic on-site visits as a shorter and more focused assessment mechanism than for Phase
2.”).
328
Heineman, Jr. & Heimann, supra note 323.
329
Id.
330
See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 697 (“There is reason to doubt that the officials from
economics, foreign, and finance ministries who sit as national representatives on the OECD
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions are particularly wellinformed concerning specific instances of bribery.”).
331
Id. at 701.
332
See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, supra note 319, at 30–
42.
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companies,333 thereby enabling the Working Group to function as a
“clearinghouse” for allegations concerning transnational bribery. 334 Other
helpful institutional innovations could be imagined that would be consistent
with the underlying principle of reducing the monitoring costs for OECD
member states. 335
The OECD Working Group could also increase the reputational effects
of its monitoring efforts by applying more resources to rigorously verify
and publicize the degree of compliance of its members. 336 Other proposals
exist that would complement the reputation effect of heightened publicity of
non-compliance, such as the idea to “tier” membership into levels
indicating each member’s progress in complying with the treaty. 337
Transfers to the OECD Working Group may also serve as an effective
compliance tool by allowing side-payments to other member states. The
Working Group is well-situated to deliver side-payments, because it is
embedded within the larger OECD, an institution used to coordinate a
variety of international policies.338 International organizations that span
multiple issue areas, such as the OECD, are good for side-payments,
because the “clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side-payments
among these issues: more potential quids are available for the quo.”339
While the strategic positions of particular OECD treaty members is difficult
to specify in advance, channeling side-payments through the OECD
Working Group is one available “carrot” that could tip the cost-benefit
analysis for member states otherwise disinclined to comply with

333
See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 701 (“Simply by establishing some kind of international
‘tipster’s line’ with an email address and a postal box at the OECD, the committee may
obtain information from a variety of heretofore untapped sources.”).
334
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 190 (suggesting that the International
Monetary Fund and/or World Bank take such an initiative).
335
See Cheng Wenhao & Umme Aiman Ahmad, Implementing International Law to
Fight Business Bribery, 5 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 12392, 12397–98 (2011) (describing initiatives
to generate greater awareness and scrutiny of corruption); A New Push on Corruption, in
OECD YEARBOOK 2011: BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES 61 (2011), available at
http://issuu.com/oecdobserver/docs/oecdyearbook2011 (discussing OECD initiatives to raise
awareness of corruption and strengthen regulation).
336
See Andrew Tyler, Note, Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention’s Peer Review Effective?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 137, 156 (2011) (“The
final and most important tool the [Working Group] has, and one it has not fully used yet, is
the ‘shame game’-the use of all the Convention’s influence to publicly pressure a noncomplying country into compliance through public statements and press releases designed to
ignite both international and domestic pressure to bring about a change of policy.”).
337
Wenhao & Ahmad, supra note 335, at 12399.
338
See Topics, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org (follow “Topics”
hyperlink) (listing a welter of global issues the OECD works on, including the economy,
finance, environment, innovation, and so on) (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
339
KEOHANE, supra note 317, at 91.
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enforcement obligations. 340
The idea to bolster the resources and capacity of the OECD Working
Group is a more effective way to remedy international under-enforcement
than pursuing more legalistic initiatives. One set of proposals likely to be
less efficacious contemplates establishing an international tribunal
dedicated to hearing and resolving claims arising out of contracts procured
through bribes. 341 However, most international tribunals charged with
adjudicating criminal conduct have been met with mixed success, 342 and
those tasked with purely contractual disputes would face serious
jurisdictional and enforceability problems.343 The one exceptionally
successful international court is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), 344 but it provides a poor analogue for
what would be required of a bribery-based court.345
Another recommendation is to create a private right of action under the
FCPA.346 But a private right of action may suffer from emboldening
competitors to sue one another after each unsuccessful bidding contest, and
could encourage the same sort of anti-competitive abuses that are common
with competitor-initiated antitrust claims. 347 The private litigation proposal
is also susceptible to general criticisms that often apply to claims that “more
litigation is the answer” to complicated global problems. 348 A more prudent
340

See Tarullo, supra note 12.
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 193–96.
342
The International Criminal Court, for one, has yet to impose a single sentence. See
Tim Lister, ‘International Justice Works’—But Maybe Not That Well, CNN (May 28, 2011,
8:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/05/28/obama.icc/index.html. Criminal
tribunals for war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda have alson been under-productive. See
POSNER, supra note 304, at 196 (“[T]he ICTY [Yugoslavia] and ICTR [Rwanda] had a joint
two-year budget of $545 million in 2006–2007, more than one-eighth of the UN’s entire
budget . . . . [T]hrough July 2008 the ICTY and the ICTY have convicted only a few dozen
defendants.”).
343
See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 195.
344
The DSB is governed by rules set out in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU). Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401.
345
The WTO DSB reviews alleged breaches of treaty obligations between states, and not
criminal claims against individual persons or corporations based on domestic statutes. See
id. art. 1, app. 1; Guzman, supra note 317, at 225 (“Among international tribunals, the
WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) is arguably the most like domestic courts.”).
346
Sandy A. Azer, Strengthening the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Through a Private
Right of Action, at 12–16 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Social
Science Research Network) (advocating for an additional, private right of action for FCPA
violations).
347
See generally William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement:
The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405 (1985).
348
See POSNER, supra note 304, at 207–25, 225 (“[R]egulation by litigation has its
341
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approach would be to channel competitor complaints through the OECD
Working Group “clearinghouse” and allow member states to evaluate and
respond to allegations of bribery as they deem appropriate in light of OECD
Convention requirements.
In contrast to the aforementioned suggestions, this Article’s approach
plays more to the comparative institutional advantage of international
organizations. As international relations scholar Robert Keohane puts it:
“[I]nternational regimes are valuable to governments not because they
enforce binding rules on others (they do not), but because they render it
possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with
one another. They empower governments rather than shackling them.”349
Creating a more robust OECD monitoring mechanism would empower
member states to mutually police one another’s compliance with treaty
obligations already in place that require the prosecution of nationals
engaged in foreign bribery.
This Part has provided a two-pronged proposal for reducing the
problem of under-enforcement of prohibitions on transnational bribery. On
the demand-side, transferring disgorged profits to Host countries
cooperative with the underlying investigation would incentivize information
sharing and provide resources to further reform domestic anti-corruption.
On the supply-side, transferring disgorgement revenue to the OECD
Working Group would enhance its ability to monitor transnational bribery,
a critical step in facilitating the mutual-policing required to overcome
collective action problems. As with the analysis of over-enforcement in
Part III, the solutions proposed here focus on modifying the sub-optimal
incentives facing key actors responsible for anti-bribery enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
Transnational bribery is a serious global problem that suffers from
both over-enforcement and under-enforcement.
The rise in FCPA
enforcement has led to the Act being applied in an extremely broad manner
that deters legitimate foreign investment and offends procedural rule-of-law
principles. Meanwhile, bribery is practically unenforced by other capitalexporting members of the OECD and lower-income countries where corrupt
transactions most often take place.
Scholarship on the FCPA alternately decries the Act’s over-zealous
enforcement or defends the hard line that, because bribery is undesirable,
prosecutions pursuant to the FCPA or other international agreements should
be encouraged and even increased. Each side takes an overly legalistic

defenders, but whatever its merits in the form of domestic litigation in the United States, the
idea that it can be extended so as to address international concerns is most implausible”).
349
KEOHANE, supra note 317, at 13.
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approach by proposing slightly more restrictive statutory definitions on the
one hand, or broader provisions and bolder international agreements on the
other. Discussion at recent congressional hearings concerning possible
amendments to the FCPA has taken the same form.
However, enforcement of transnational anti-bribery measures is
dysfunctional because of underlying political economy problems facing the
relevant governments and their bureaucracies, not because of defectively
drafted legal instruments. To more appropriately align the incentives of
domestic and international actors responsible for deterring bribery, this
Article proposes that the SEC divert disgorgement revenue from the U.S.
Treasury to Host countries where bribery takes place and the OECD
Working Group. Transferring disgorged profits in this manner would tend
to reduce the rent-seeking opportunities that lead U.S. Enforcement
Agencies to pursue unbalanced over-enforcement. At the same time, it
would reverse the free-riding calculus facing Host countries responsible for
the demand-side of bribery, and OECD member states on the supply-side,
both of which are currently overly reliant on U.S. enforcement efforts.
The policy proposed in this Article is intended to provide a creative,
global approach to dealing with the important problem of transnational
bribery and developing world corruption. It can also be understood as an
attempt to solve an increasingly common form of regulatory dilemma—
concerning business, trade, and the environment—for which the United
States can no longer hope to be effective by taking a unilateral approach.
Globalization of the economy increases the number of state and private
actors relevant to any particular policy area and multiplies opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage. Finding solutions to the new breed of cross-border
regulatory problems therefore requires imagining strategic, multilateral
policies that are attentive to the interests and capacities of the various
international actors involved.
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